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Abstract
This Article focuses on the federal estate and gift tax treatment of
copyright termination rights. The ability of a creative individual to terminate
prior copyright transfers serves to protect against economic exploitation.
Once a copyright's value has been establishedin the marketplace, the author
(or the author's heirs) enjoys a "second look" at the gi, sale, license or other
transferof a copyright. But copyright terminationrights-intendedto enhance
the economic well-being of authors and artists-undermineestate planning
strategies available to owners of other types ofproperty. There is no policy
justificationfor such discrimination,and so this Article proposes legislative
changes that would level the playingfieldfor wealth transfer tax purposes.
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I Introduction
Estate planning with copyrights presents special challenges. Copyrights
are different-at least for estate planning purposes-from other property
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interests in two notable ways. First, copyrights have a defined lifespan.'
Second, the creator of the copyrightable work has an unwaivable statutory right
of termination with respect to any grant of a transfer or license of a copyright
made on or after January 1, 1978.2 This termination right is exercisable only
during a specified time period,' and does not apply to derivative works4 or
works made for hire." If the author dies before exercising her termination right
but before the applicable time period expires, then certain of the author's heirs,
as specified in the statute, may exercise the termination right.6 These
termination rights make copyrights "sticky" for wealth transfer tax purposes.
Consequently, copyrights are difficult to give away in a tax-effective matter.
Because of the highly specialized nature of their respective fields,
copyright specialists tend to know little about estate planning and vice versa.
intellectual property literature explains the nature of termination rights, but it is
virtually silent on tax planning for donative transfers of intellectual property.7
Conversely, estate planning literature occasionally discusses conflicts between
the substantive law of copyrights, 8 on the one hand, and donative transfers, on
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation and... endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and 70 years after the author's death.").
2. See id. § 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.');
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5741 ("The
provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the
present section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24) should be eliminated, and that the
proposed law should substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against
unremunerative transfers."); see also BRUCE P. KilER &JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGH-T LAw:
A PRACTITONER's GUIDE

§ 7:5.2[A] (2005) (discussing the scope of transfers by authors of

copyrights). Transfers or licenses prior to January 1, 1978, are beyond the scope of this
discussion. In this Article, the term "author" refers to any author, artist, entertainer, performer
or other person whose creative work gives rise to property subject to copyright protection.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time
during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution
of the grant. .. .)
4. See id. § 203(b)(1) ("A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but
this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.").
5. See id. § 203(a) ("In the case of any work other than a work made for hire. ...
6. See id. § 203(a)(2) (dictating which of the author's heirs may exercise the termination
interest).

7. See, e.g., KELLER& CUNARD,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11I(1996).
8.

supranote 2; 3 MELVILLE B.NIMER &DAVID

NMMER,

See generally Cheryl E. Hader, Making the Intangible Tangible. Planningfor

IntellectualProperty, 29 EST.

PLAN~.

574 (2002).
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the other.9 Rarely does one find a thorough analysis of the wealth transfer tax
consequences of copyright transfers and the particular tax concerns that arise
with respect to copyright termination rights.Yo This Article seeks to fill that
void.
Part I provides an overview of an author's copyright termination rights.
Part 11 explores gift tax considerations for three taxpayers: an author who
hoards copyrights (or makes no transfers during lifetime), an author who gives
copyrights (during lifetime or at death), and an author who sells an interest in a
copyright. In the latter two cases, a gift tax may be imposed on the value of the
termination rights that arise in an author's spouse and heirs. Part HII considers
the estate tax treatment of transfers by the same three taxpayers: the hoarder,
the giver, and the seller of a copyright. The tax consequences depend in part on
when an author dies in relation to the period for exercise of the termination
right. Part IV attempts to reconcile the special property law treatment of
copyrights with the wealth transfer tax consequences of hoarding, giving, or
selling them. Contrary to federal copyright law's intended purpose of securing
economic benefits for authors and their families, the law in fact disadvantages
creative individuals. Termination rights cause creative individuals to be subject
to more estate and gift taxation than similarly situated taxpayers who own
noncopyright property. Copyrights are "sticky" insofar as they are difficult to
transfer without attracting some wealth transfer tax liability-not just with
respect to the copyright itself but also with respect to the termination rights that
arise under federal copyright law in the author and the author's heirs. Part V
proposes revisions to federal copyright law to eliminate the (seemingly
unintended) negative estate and gift tax aspects of sticky intellectual property
termination rights.

9. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & John Sare, Estate Planningfor Authors andArtists,
81 5-2d TAX MGMT. PoRTrouios A-i1, A-3 1, A-36 (2004) (discussing some of the copyright
transfer issues involved in estate planning); Ann Bartow, Intellectual Property andDomestic
Relations: Issues to Consider When There is an Artist, Author, Inventor, or Celebrity in the
Family, 35 FAm. L.Q. 383, 401-11 (2001) (explaining how a copyright author can terminate a
license or transfer); Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estatesfrom the Constraintsof Copyright, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 109, 112 (2006) (discussing the problems the Copyright Act of 1976 created for
authors attempting to transfer copyright rights at death).
10. The two minor exceptions appear to be Jeffrey K. Eisen & Allan E. Biblin, Estate
Planningfor Clients in the Entertainment Business, EST. PLAN., Feb. 2006, at 26, 29-32
(discussing estate tax consequences involving copyrights), and William M. Weintraub & Burton
A. Mitchell, Estateand Gift Tax PlanningforCopyright Owners, L.A. LAW., May 25, 2002, at
20, 20-27 (explaining the various tax issues involved with the transfer and termination of
copyright tights).
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As a general matter, taxpayers can make inter vivos gifts of their property
and thereby "freeze out" of their estate all post-gift appreciation and income."
This advantage is forfeited, however, where the donor retains certain kinds of
access to, or control over, the gifted asset.'12 In such a case, the date-of-death
value of the asset is included in the donor's gross estate, thereby causing all
post-gift appreciation to be subject to estate tax.13 Thus, well-advised taxpayers
seeking to freeze the value of their estate through an inter vivos gift should
make sure not to retain any prohibited access or control.'14 In contrast, in the
case of a copyright, this kind of planning does not work as effectively. Because
of termination rights, the author-whether gifting or selling the copyrightmay not be able to achieve the same kind of "freeze" that is enjoyed by
taxpayers owning other kinds of property."S From a copyright perspective,
termination rights may protect the author from exploitation and, therefore, may
be viewed as a salutary concept, but they produce discrimination on the tax
front that cannot be justified.
1. Overview of IntellectualProperty Termination Rights
Under the 1976 Copyright Act,'16 a copyrght tyically lasts for the
creator's lifetime plus seventy years in the case of a work (other than a work for
Until that expiration date,
hire) created on or after January 1, 1978.1
copyrights are as freely transferrable as other property interests,'18 subject to one
11. See generally MitchelliM. Gans, GRIT's, GRAT's andGRLJT's: PlanningandPolicy,
11IVA. TAX REv. 761, 763 (1992) (explaining how inter vivos gifts can be used to reduce
transfer tax liability).
12. See id. at 878-911 (explaining the estate tax consequences of retaining an income
interest for a term of years or life).
13. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Putting the Heat on Freezes, 2
PROB. & PROP. 12, 13-14 (1988) ("Prior to OBRA, Section 2036(a) provided that pre-death
transfers ...were beyond the scope of estate tax inclusion under Section 2036 even if the
transferor retained an income interest in... the property until death. But OBRA elim-inates, this
bona fide transfer exception under the new rule. ... ")
14. See id (providing examples demonstrating the estate tax benefits of not retaining any
access or control to an inter vivos gift).
15. Infra Part IIIB-C.
16. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006)).
17. 17 U.S.C. §302(a). The copyrights of the owner of a work for hire expire 120 years
from the date of the work's creation or 95 years from the date of its first publication, whichever
occurs first. Id § 302(c). For purposes of this Article, all examples assume that the copyright
relates to a work other than a work for hire and one created on or after January 1, 1978.
18. See id. § 201l(d)( 1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
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major caveat: "In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the
exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any
right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978,
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination. . . ."19 The author may
terminate a copyright if she is alive during the specified exercise period for
giving notice and for termination of the interest. 20 If not, certain of the author's
heirs specified by statute may exercise the termination right.' Ordinarily, the
heirs who may terminate an author's prior transfers are the author's surviving
spouse (who owns a one-half interest in the termination right) and children
(who, together with any children of a predeceased child of the author, own the
remaining one-half interest in the termination right per stirpes) .2 2 If
grandchildren of the author become entitled to participate, they must exercise
by majority vote the termination interest that otherwise would have passed to
their parent, had their parent survived the author. 23 Termination requires the
agreement of more than half of the beneficial owners of the termination right.24
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.").
19. Id. § 203(a). Some scholars have referred to this ability of the author or the author's
heirs to disrupt prior transfers as "contract bumping." See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The
Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J.
COPYRIGHTr

Soc'Y 77, 77-114 (1988) (describing the history and process of bumping); Michael

Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and
Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 166-67 (1997) ("In essence, if an author assigned his
copyright during the first copyright term, the Statute of Anne mandated a return of the copyright
interest to the author at the end of the term, thereby 'bumping' the assignment contract in favor
of copyright law.").
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)( ) ("In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination
of the grant may be effected by that author.. .. ")
21. This discussion is limited to grants of a transfer or license of a copyright or of any
right under a copyright executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978. Id. § 203(a).
Specifically, if a spouse but no children or grandchildren survive the decedent, this termination
right passes to the decedent's surviving spouse. Id. § 203(a)(2)(A). If the decedent is survived
by a spouse and any children or grandchildren, the termination right passes one-half to the
surviving spouse. Id. The other half passes to the decedent's children and grandchildren per
stirpes. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B)-(C). The termination rights passing to the children of any
predeceased child of the decedent may be exercised only by a majority of such predeceased
child's surviving children. Id. § 203(a)(2)(C). If a decedent is not survived by a spouse, but is
survived by any children or grandchildren, the termination right passes to such children and
grandchildren, per stirpes. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B)-(C). If a spouse does not survive the decedent,
children, or grandchildren, the termination right passes to the decedent's executor or
administrator. Id. § 203(a)(2)(D).
22. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(C) (2006) ("[T]he share of the children of a dead child in a
termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a majority of them.").
24. See id. § 203(a)(1) ("In the case of a grant executed by one author.... if the author is

3
31

STICKY COPYRIGHTS

This means that if an author's widow or widower succeeds to a one-half interest
in the termination right, at least one of the author's surviving children (or the
children of any predeceased child, acting by majority) must join to effect the
termination.
Whether held by the author or by the author's heirs, termination rights
may be exercised only during a five-year time period . 25 The window for
exercise "opens" thirty-five years after the author's grant of the copyright; if the
initial grant also included the right of publication, the window opens at the
earlier of thirty-five years after publication or forty years from the date of the
grant.26

The window then "closes" five years later .27 Notice of termination,

however, must be given at least two years in advance-and may be given up to
ten years in advance-of the window's opening.*2 Practically speaking, this
means that, at any time between twenty-five and thirty-eight years from the date
of the initial grant, an author (or the author's heirs) may serve a notice of
termination .2 Afe h uthor or her heirs give notice, termination occurs
automatically on the date during the five-year window that is specified in the
notice. 30 If the author subsequently dies before the termination actually occurs,
the copyright becomes part of the author's estate.' So if an author gives notice
in year twenty-five of her intent to terminate a copyright in year thirty-six, but
dies in year twenty-nine, the copyright is delivered to her estate in year thirtysix. 3
dead, [the grant may be effected] by the person or persons who ... own and are entitled to
exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's termination interest.").
25. See id. § 203(a)(3) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant....)
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. § 203(a)(4)(A) ("[Tlhe notice shall be served not less than two or more than
ten years before ... [the] date [of termination].").
29. Id
30. See id. § 203(b) ("Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that
were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning
termination interess. . . .
3 1. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("Because [the author] died after the notice of termination was served, her rights under the
terminated grant had vested and thus passed to her estate."), modified, 678 F. Supp. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Bobby Rosenbioum, A Very Welcome Return: Copyright Reversion

and Termination of CopyrightAssignments in the Music Industry,

17 ENT. & SPORTs L.

3, 7

(1989) (stating that, where an author dies after notice of termination is given but before the
termination window opens, the copyright vests in the author's estate, not in her statutory heirs).
32. See Bourne Co., 675 F. Supp. at 862 (finding that a copyright vests when notice of
termination is given).
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The law of donative transfers generally reflects a commitment to the
principle of testamentary freedom 33-the ability of a testator to dispose of
property at death as she chooses as long as the transfer does not contradict
public policy. 34 In that sense, copyright law is consistent with the law of wills
and trusts. An author may make testamentary transfers of copyrights or
interests in copyrights free from any claim by statutory heirs to terminate the
transfer .3 5 Heirs may challenge death-time dispositions of copyrights only
through a standard will contest (or possibly a separate claim of tortious
interference).3
With respect to lifetime transfers, copyright law takes a position that is
inconsistent with a commitment to free transfer, or even vigorous property
ownership. An author and the author's heirs may revisit grants of copyrights or
interests in copyrights once the intellectual property's value has been
established in the marketplace.3 Practically speaking, termination rights over
lifetime transfers thus operate as a right of revocation in the author's hands, or a
veto right in the heirs' hands. Termination trumps (or "bumps" )38 any and all
prior agreements or promises .3 9 The property then re-vests in the author, if
33.

According to the Restatement (Third) of Property, the purpose of the law of donative

transfers is to "facilitate rather than regulate." See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF PROP.: WILS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003) ("American law curtails freedom of
disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose
that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law.").
34. A bequest conditioned on a beneficiary's divorce from a current spouse is an example

of a transfer that offends public policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DoNATIVE
TRANSFERS § 7.1 (1983) ("An otherwise effective restriction in a donative transfer .. . designed
to permit the acquisition or retention of... property by the transferee only in the event of a
separation or divorce ...is invalid, unless the dominant motive of the transferor is to provide
support in the event of separation or divorce ... 1.
35. Termination rights apply to transfers executed by the grantor "otherwise than by will."
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). Indeed, if an author dies owning a copyright, without ever having
assigned an interest in it to anyone, the author is free to dispose of that copyright as he or she
chooses. Id.
36. See JESSE DLJKEM[NIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 141-94, 199-235 (7th ed.
2005) (noting common grounds for a will contest, such as defects in the execution, lack of
mental capacity, undue influence, fraud, and duress).
37. See JAY DRAinER, JR. & STEPHEN M. McJoHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

§ 6.04(A)[1] (2008) ("By allowing

copyright grants and licenses to be terminated after a number of years,.... the statute lets
authors and their statutory successors recoup more of the commercial value of works whose true
value emerges in time.").
38. See Nevins, supra note 19, at 77 (defining the term "bumps").
39. See 17 U. S.C. § 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary. ......
"). The notice must comply in content and form with rules
promulgated by the Register of Copyrights and a copy of the termination notice must be
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living, or if not, the author's heirs--even those who did not join in the

termination-in proportion to their ownership of the termination

rights. 4 0

The copyright law might appear to offer more protection for testamentary
transfers than for inter vivos transfers, insofar as heirs have limited grounds to
challenge an author's death-time transfers. Heirs have an almost unconstrained
ability to terminate lifetime transfers . 4 ' This discrepancy is especially odd
given that the law demands less, in terms of mental capacity, from one who
executes a will than from one who enters into a contract (or makes a gift)
during lifetime.4 But in fact, both the law of wills and trusts and the law of
copyright share the goal of minimizing the likelihood of an economically
disastrous lifetime transfer. The law of donative transfers does this by requiring
that a person be capable of understanding the economic consequences of her
actions.4 Copyright law accomplishes this by theorizing copyright interests as
unsusceptible to accurate valuation until exploited, usually commercially."4
Thus all lifetime transfers of copyright interests are worthy of suspicion, if not
inherently unstable.4
Termination rights are the copyright law's protection against transactions
that are grossly unfair to the author." In the parts that follow, we examine
recorded in the Copyright Office in order to take effect later. Id § 203(a)(4)(A).
40. See id § 203(b) ("Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that
were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning
termination interests . . . .)
41. See Tritt, supra note 9, at 173 ("If an author makes lifetime gifts of copyright interests
and dies before the termination rights vest in the author, the statutory heirs may potentially
bump these lifetime gifts.").

42. See RESTATEMENT (TI{IRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATivE TRANSFERS
§ 8. 1(c) (2003) (stating that, to make a lifetime gift, a transferor must have testamentary capacity

"plus"-the capacity for "understanding the effect that the gift may have on the future financial
security of the donor and of anyone who may be dependent on the donor"); see also Lee v. Lee,
337 So. 2d 713, 715 (Miss. 1976) (holding that the testator had mental ability to execute a valid
will, but not to make a valid lifetime conveyance of real property).
43. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 36, at 145-46 (finding that to make a donative
transfer, an individual must "meet all of the elements for making a will" and understand the
financial consequences of the transfer).

44.

See generally DRATLER

& MCJOH-N,

supra note 37.

45. See Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, andFormn, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 157 (1989) ("Despite
the benevolent motives and family settings usually associated with gifts, the accepted
justification for formality assumes that, in giving, people are fundamentally unreliable and
deceitful.").
46. Copyright law does not permit the author or the author's heirs to relinquish, transfer,
or trade their termination rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (2006) ("Termination of the grant
may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make
a will or to make any future grant."); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476. 124 (1976) ("A provision
of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part

34
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three scenarios of interest from a gift tax perspective and then from an estate
tax perspective. An author with a copyright created by her may retain the
property, making no lifetime transfers; she may gratuitously give the property
away; or she may sell or license the copyright. We call these authors hoarders,
givers, and sellers, respectively. Each faces wealth transfer tax rules with
different-and often unpredictable-results.
11. Gift Taxation of Copyright Interests
A. The HoardingAuthor: No Gif, No Tax
From a gift tax perspective, the simplest scenario involves an author who
makes no transfers of copyrights during her lifetime. Generally speaking,
I.R.C. § 2501 imposes a tax on all property transferred by gift during a calendar
year by any individual . 4 ' A gift is any disposition of property "for a
consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the
donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration given
therefor.",4 8 Gifts of property having a value less than or equal to the annual
exclusion amount ($13,000 in 2009 and 2010) are not subject to taxation.4
Each citizen or resident of the United States has a cumulative credit of
$1,000,000 against the gift tax. 50 So a "hoarding" author, one who makes no
property transfers during lifetime, should owe no gift tax. But in the hands of
an author who gives or sells an interest in a copyright, the copyright is "sticky"
and potentially can result in transfer-tax complications.

from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited.").
47. See I.R.C. §250 l(a)(l) (2006) ("A tax. ...
is hereby imposed for each calendar year
on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual resident or
nonresident."). A donative transfer by an author of a copyright with respect to which no other
grants or licenses have been made is fairly straightforward from a gift and estate tax perspective.
Tax is imposed on the fair market value of the property transferred. See generally id. § 2501
(imposing gift tax); id. § 2512(b) (declaring the method for valuing gifts); id. § 2001 (imposing
estate tax); id. § 2031 (defining the gross estate).
48. Treas. Reg. § 25.25 12-8 (1992).
49. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (explaining that gifts up to the statutory limit shall not be
considered "taxable gifts"). For the inflation adjustment, see Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45
I.R.B. 617 ("For calendar year 2010, the first $13,000 of gifts to any person (other than gifts of
fuiture interests in property) are not included in the total amount of taxable gifts under § 2503
made during that year.").
50. See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (allowing the $1,000,000 cumulative credit).
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B. The Giving Author and the Repetitive Gift Syndrome
Any lifetime transfer of a copyright-whether gratuitous or not-gives
rise to termination rights in the grantor and certain statutorily designated heirs."'
In the vocabulary of wills and trusts, these termination rights operate as timedelayed and time-limited rights of revocation held first by the author and then
by the author's heirs. 2 So a lifetime gift of a copyright, then, gives rise to three
distinct interests: the transferee's interest in the copyright, the author's
termination rights, and the heirs' (contingent) termination rights.5
1. GeneralRules Applicable to Gifts
Consider first a scenario in which an author transfers a copyright without
consideration to a third-party donee:
Hypothetical 1. Author is married and has two adult children. Author
already applied his maximum unified credit to prior lifetime transfers. On
January 1, 2009, each of Author and his wife made a $13,000 annual
exclusion cash gift to Person B, an unrelated third party. Author is the
creator and owner of a copyright having a fair market value of $20,000. On
February 1, 2009, Author gives the copyright to PersonB and receives no
consideration in return.
The cash gifts of $13,000 are protected by the annual exclusion and are not
subject to gift tax. 14 But when Author subsequently gives the copyright to
Person B, even if Author and his spouse agree to split the gift, 55 the transfer is

51.

Supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.

52. See supra Part 11 (discussing termination rights as having the effect of revocation
rights).
53. Supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
54. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2006) ("[11n the case of gifts... the first $ 10,000 of such
gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of
gifts made during such year.").
55. See id § 2513(a)(1) ("A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse
shall ...be considered as made one-half by him and one-half by his spouse."). Gift splitting
requires the nondonor spouse to indicate his or her consent on the donor's timely filed gift tax
return. Id § 2513(a)(2) ("[I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1)] shall apply only if both spouses have
signified ... their consent."); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.25 13-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983)
(explaining that consent to the application of I.R.C. § 2513 is sufficient if the consent of the
husband is signified on the wife's return (and vice-versa), each spouse signifies consent on their
own return, or both signify' it on one of the returns). Only when each spouse is either a citizen
or resident of the United States at the time of the transfer may spouses gift-split. I.R.C.
§ 2513(a)(1).
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taxable. 56 Author has no remaining unified credit to "shelter" the subsequent

gift, thus causing the gift to produce a gift tax

liability. 57

What is the value of

the transfer for gift tax purposes? At initial glance, Author appears to make a
gift of a copyright worth $20,000. On closer examination, the situation is more
complex.
When Author gives Person B the copyright on February 1, 2009, federal
copyright law creates in Author58 and Author's heirs"9 a right to terminate the
transfer to Person B. Prior to the gift from Author to Person B, these

termination rights did not exist. 60 I the case of Hypothetical 1, the rights may
be exercised beginning on February 1, 2044, until February 1,2049.6 Exercise
may be effectuated by delivering to Person B-at any time after February 1,
2034 (ten years before the commencement of the exercise period), but no later
than February 1, 2042 (two years prior to the expiration of the exercise
period) 6 -written notice of the intent to exercise the termination right.
Termination then would occur automatically at the time specified in the notice
of exercise.6 If Author were to die without exercising his termination rights
but before they have expired, then his surviving widow and adult children
would own-and they could exercise-the termination interest.64
56. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
57. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006) (granting author right to terminate grant).
59. See id. § 203(a)(2) (granting author's heirs right to terminate grant).
60. See id. § 203(a) (delineating termination rights that come into existence upon
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of a copyright).
6 1. See id. § 203 (a)(3) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant.").
62. See id. § 203(a)(4) ("The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in
wrting ... upon the grantee. .... [Tihe notice shall be served not less than two or more than
ten years before [the effective date of termination].").
63. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc'ns Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("When a termination is effected, all rights covered by the terminated grant revert, on the
effective date of tenmination, to the author or his statutory successor."); modiied, 678 F. Supp.
70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2006) ("Where an author is dead, his or her termination
interest is owned, and may be exercised [by his or her statutory successors, as defined in
§ 203(a)(2)(A) through § 203(a)(2)(D)]."). Hypothetical 1 and the related examples are
distinguishable from Stewart v. A bend in several ways. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 221
(1990) ("[Ilf the author dies before the renewal period, then the assignee [of the renewal rights]
may continue to use the original work only ifthe author's successor transfers the renewal rights
to the assignee."). In Stewart, the Court ruled that a successor copyright holder could prevent
production of derivative works, where right to produce derivative works arose under agreement
with original copyright holder who died before renewal term. Id. Apart from the facts that the
Stewart case arose under the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35. Stat. 1075, and
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To be more concrete, when Author transfers a copyright to PersonB on
February 1, 2009, there are three property interests to track for gift tax
purposes: (1) the copyright transferred to PersonB;65 (2) the termination rights
that arise in Author himsel; 6 and (3) the termination rights that arise
(contingently) in Author's spouse and children. 67 It is clear that Author
transfers the copyright by gift to Person B. It is less clear whether Author
transfers (or if, instead, copyrightlaw creates)the termination rights to (or in)
Author and his heirs. Without a transfer by Author, there cannot be a gifttaxable transaction. 6 8 The next subsection evaluates whether, for gift tax
purposes, there is a transferby Author of the termination rights, and if so, how
the transfer should be treated for gift tax purposes.
2. No Transfer, No Gift
Absent statutory rules on what constitutes a transferfor gift tax purposes,
we look to case law for the meaning of the term. Generally speaking, for gift
tax purposes, one cannot make a "transfer" to oneself. 69 Therefore, even if the
author, not federal copyright law, is the source of the termination right, the
author cannot transfer that right to himself for gift tax purposes. No gift tax
will be imposed on the creation (or "retention") of the author's termination

right. 70

Consider next whether the author transfers termination rights to his heirs.
Case law suggests that no gift-taxable transfer occurs without a sufficient

involved renewal rights, not termination rights, the holders of termination rights in the property
transferred in Hypothetical 1 are in a position analogous to the successor copyright holder-not
the licensee-in Stewart. Id. at 212. The rights of Author or Author's heirs to terminate the
prior transfer in Hypothetical I are superior to PersonB's rights in the property, just as the
successor copyright holder's rights were superior to the licensee's in Stewart.
65. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (granting termination right to Author); see also infra
Part III.B.2.
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (granting termination rights to Author's heirs); see also
infra Part I1I.B.2 (discussing the transfer of termination rights to an author's heir).
68. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006) (imposing a gift tax on any "transfer of property by
gift"). A transfer is a condition precedent to the imposition of a gift tax. Id.
69. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (as amended in 1997); Comm'r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d
352, 353 (10th Cir. 1947) ("[T~he tax cannot be sustained unless there was a trnsferor, a
transferee, and an effective transfer. . .. )
70. But see infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing application of I.R.C.
§ 2702).
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degree of voluntariness. 7 '

In Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, the
decedent worked for a company that provided a benefit plan to all regular

employees . 73 The decedent's spouse thus was entitled to a death benefit. 74 The
United States Tax Court found that the decedent had not made a taxable
transfer to his spouse of the value of the death benefit simply by going to
work . 75 The court noted several factors: "the decedent's participation in the
pension plan inaugurated by his employer was not voluntary," the decedent had
no role in selecting the beneficiaries, and, except by resigning from his
employment, the decedent could not defeat the beneficiaries' rights to the death
benefit.7 The court explained: "[W]e do not believe that a taxable event can
occur for gift tax purposes unless there is first and in fact an act of transfer by
the donor; and there can be no act of transfer unless the act is voluntary. ...
that
is, he must intend to do so."" In other words, accepting employment is not a
"transfer" for gift tax purposes, absent any action directed toward the creation
of the survivorship benefit.7
Applying DiMarco to the creation of the heirs' termination rights in
Hypothetical 1, the voluntariness required for the imposition of a gift tax
appears to be present. When Author in Hypothetical I makes a gift of the
copyright to PersonB, Author takes specific and directed action with respect to
the property in which the heirs' termination rights arise. Unlike the decedent in
DiMarco, however, Author in Hypothetical 1 undertakes a "voluntary" action
for the sole purpose of making a donative transfer. Author intentionally
71. See, e.g., Estate of DiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653,663 (1986) ("[T]here can be no
act of transfer unless the act is voluntary and the transferor has some awareness that he is in fact
making a transfer of property, that is, he must intend to do so.").
72. See id (holding that decedent did not make a taxable gift of the survivor's income
benefit to his spouse, and the present value of the survivor's income benefit is not, therefore, an
adjusted taxable gift).
73. Id. at 655. Under the benefit plan, if an employee died, an amount equal to three
times the employee's annual compensation became payable to his or her surviving spouse and
dependents. Id. The individual employee had no power to change the benefit, designate
different beneficiaries or terminate the benefit (except by resigning from employment). Id The
Service sought to impose a gift tax. Id at 657-5 8. The court, however, concluded that because
the transfer to the surviving spouse was not sufficiently voluntary, it could not be subject to gift
tax. Id. at 663.
74. See id. at 655 (explaining survivors benefit plan).
75. See id. at 622-63 ("Respondent argues, however, that decedent's simple act of going
to work for IBM on January 9, 1950, constituted an act of transfer by decedent for gift tax
purposes. We disagree.").
76. Id at 662.
77. Id. at 663.
78. Id at 662-63 (summarizing court's position that decedent's working at IBM did not
constitute an act of transfer for gift tax purposes).
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disposes of property that otherwise would be includible in his gross estate at
death, thereby creating rights in his heirs .79 For gift tax to function as a
meaningful "back-stop" for estate tax, a donative transfer of a copyright should
be precisely the type of voluntary action that gives rise to a taxable gift of the
80
termination rights.
Admittedly, in both DiMarco and Hypothetical 1, the decedent lacks the
ability to designate the recipients of the termination rights.8 1 But Author in
Hypothetical 1 is fully aware that he is making a donative transfer (to Person
B). Author's actions are sufficiently voluntary and connected to the creation of
the termination rights so that a court likely would find that Author's creation of
the termination rights is a transfer for gift tax purposes to the holders of the
contingent termination rights.8 If so, the next question is what value the
transfers have for gift tax purposes.
3. Valuing Sticky Copyrights
In order to determine the value of any taxable gift by Author in
Hypothetical 1, we must determine not only the value of the interest transferred
to PersonB but also the value of the termination right (whether retained by
Author or transferred to his heirs). Under I.R.C. § 2702, for purposes of
valuing a donative transfer in trust to or for a member of the transferor's
family, 83 an interest in trust retained by the transferor or certain members of the
79.

Supra Part 11.
80. See Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39,44 (1939) (describing purpose of gift
tax as "to prevent or compensate for avoidance of death taxes"). Again, this assumes that the
author is treated as having made a transfer of the termination rights. Supra notes 7 1-73 and
accompanying text.
81. See Estate of DiMarco v. Commn'r, 87 T.C. 653, 655 (1986) (describing decedent's
inability to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the Group Life Insurance and Survivors Income
Benefit Plan).
82. For a discussion of the gift tax consequences of the characterization of the expiration
of the termination right as a taxable lapse, see infra Part III.B.4. Note that if the author is alive
at the time the termination window opens, the author may defeat the heirs' termination rights by
revesting the property in himself. In a conventional analysis, this power should partially defeat
the gift. See Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1999) (indicating that the donor's power to
revoke or extinguish the gift negates it); see also Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181
( 1943) ("The essence of a gift by trust is the abandonment of control over the property put in
trust."). This analysis, however, must be subject to two qualifications. First, because the giver's
ability to defeat the termination right is contingent upon surviving until the window opens, the
value of the giver's retained right must reflect this contingency. Second, 1.R.C. § 2702
(discussed in Part II.B.3, infra), somewhat supplants the conventional analysis, permitting the
retention of such a contingent right to be disregarded in determining the value of the gift.
83. For purposes of I.R.C. § 2702, a transfer resulting in one or more term interests is
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transferor's family is valued at zero, unless it is a "qualified interest."84 A
qualified interest is the right to receive fixed payments, at least annually; the
right to receive a fixed percentage of the fair market value of property held in
trust, payable at least annually; or a noncontingent remainder interest in certain
trusts."5 A copyright termination right does not meet the definition of a
"qualified interest" for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702,8 and so the rights ofAuthor
should have zero value for gift tax purposes. 87 Thus, the interest transferred to
Person B, as well as the value of any retained or transferred termination right,
88
would be taxable.
The next section considers what exclusions or deductions, if any, might be
available in connection with a gift of a copyright or a copyright termination
interest.

treated as a transfer in trust. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-4(a) (1992) ("For purposes of section
2702, a transfer of an interest in property with respect to which there are one or more term
interests is treated as a transfer in trust. A term interest is one of a series of successive (as
contrasted with concurrent) interests.").
84. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (2006) ("The value of any retained interest which is not a
qualified interest shall be treated as being zero."). A "qualified interest" means:
(1) any interest which consists of the right to receive fixed amounts payable not less
frequently than annually,
(2) any interest which consists of the right to receive amounts which are payable
not less frequently than annually and are a fixed percentage of the fair market value
of the property in the trust (determined annually), and
(3) any noncontingent remainder interest if all of the other interests in the trust
consist of interests described in paragraph (1) or (2).
Id § 2702(b).
85. See id. § 2702(b) (defining a "qualified interest").
86. See id. (giving three separate criteria, at least one of which must be met before interest
can be considered "qualified"); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (same). We
assume throughout the remainder of this Article that the author is deemed to make a transferof
the termination rights that arise in his heirs. If this were not the case, the analysis would differ.
87. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 2702, the author would not be deemed to have made
a gift of the retained interest. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943) (reflecting
the government's concession that the taxpayer did not make a gift of a retained reversion).
88. Presumably, the value of any copyright itself takes into account the likelihood that the
termination rights will be exercised at some point in the future, among other factors. See
GORDON V. Sum- & RUSSELL L. PARM VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE
ASSETS 300-01 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that the value of copyrights to an individual owner is
solely represented by the present value of future royalty income). Beyond that, if one assumes
that Author has made a taxable transfer of the termination rights, and that Author's interest has
zero value for gift tax purposes, then all of the value-the fair market value of $20,000-must
be allocated between the interest transferred to PersonB and the interests that arise in the giving
author's spouse and heirs. It is not clear how that value should be allocated between the
copyright transferee and the holders of the termination rights.
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4. Qualifying Sticky Copyrightsfor Beneficial Tax Treatment
a. The Annual Exclusion
With any gift, one looks to see whether the transfer might qualify for the
annual exclusion. Under I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1), gifts (other than gifts of future

interests in property) are not included in the total amount of taxable

gifts.89 To

the extent that the value of the copyright is less than the annual exclusion
amount, some portion of the value of the transfer to Person B will escape
taxation. 90 But the heirs' termination rights, exercisable no sooner than thirtyfive years after the transfer of the copyright, 9' are future interests that will not
92
qualify for the annual exclusion.
b. The MaritalDeduction
As a technical matter, it is possible that a lifetime gift of a copyright to a
spouse might not qualify for the marital deduction.9 The regulations explicitly
provide that copyrights are terminable interests. 94 They further deny the marital
deduction for a terminable interest when the transferor retains an interest in the
transferred property and may "possess or enj oy any part of the property after the
termination or failure of the interest therein transferred to the donee spouse. "95
To the extent that a copyright transferor is deemed to "retain" the termination
right, even though the right arises by operation of law ,9 no marital deduction
would appear to be available. As a matter of policy, such a result would be
problematic. In effect, copyright holders would be unable to make tax-free
transfers to their spouse of their intellectual property. Contrast this with the
ability of owners of virtually every other type of property to make tax-free
lifetime gifts. There is no justification for such inequity.
89. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).
90. See id (explaining that gifts up to the annual exclusion amount are not counted as
taxable gifts); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text (same).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006) (setting timetable for exercise of termination rights);
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (same).
92. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (excluding future interests in property from qualifuing as taxexempt gifts); see also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and
valuation of heirs' contingent termination of rights).
93. I.R.C. § 2523(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-l(c) (1994).
94. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(a)(3).
95. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(c)(l).
96. JnfraPart V.B. 1.

4267 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25 (2010)

42

When an author makes a gratuitous transfer of an interest in copyright,
consider the possibility that the termination rights arising in the author's spouse
have value and that they qualify for the gift tax marital deduction.9 Generally
speaking, gifts to a spouse who is a United States citizen will qualify for the
marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2523 unless the transferred property is a
nondeductible terminable interest. 98 A terminable interest is one which "will
terminate or fail on the lapse of time or on the occurrence or failure to occur of
some contingency. "99 Examples of terminable interests include life estates,
terms of years, patents, and copyrights.'100 Like a term of years, a copyright
interest lasts for a fixed period of time. 0 1 But not all terminable interests are
nondeductible. 102 For gift tax purposes, nondeductible terminable interests
arise:
(1) if the donor retains in himself, or transfers or has transferred (for less
than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) to any
person other than such donee spouse (or the estate of such spouse), an
interest in such property, and if by reason of such retention or transfer the
donor (or his heirs or assigns) or such person (or his heirs or assigns) may
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure
of the interest transferred to the donee spouse; or
(2) if the donor immediately after the transfer to the donee spouse has a
power to appoint an interest in such property which he can exercise (either
alone or in conjunction with any person) in such manner that the appointee
may possess or enjoy any party of such property after 03
such termination of
failure of the interest transferred to the donee spouse.1

97.
98.

See id § 2523(a) (establishing the gift tax marital deduction).
See id § 2523 (allowing for the marital deduction except where the gift is a life estate
or a terminable interest and other enumerated conditions apply).
99. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-lI(a)(3) (1994); seealso .RC. § 2056(b)(1) ("Where, on the
lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or
contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no
deduction shall be allowed.").
100. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(a)(3) (1994) ("Life estates, terms for years, annuities,
patents, and copyrights are therefore terminable interests.").
101. Except in the case of works made for hire, copyrights in works created after January 1,
1978, last for the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)
("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and,
[subject to certain exceptions], endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70
years after the author's death.").
102. See I.R.C. § 2523(b) (2006) (giving conditions whereby a transfer of a terminable
interest is nondeductible).
103. Id.
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To take the classic example, assume that a transferor creates a lifetime income
interest in her transferee-spouse. Upon the death of the transferee-spouse, the
remainder in the property passes to the children of the transferor.'04 In this
example, the transferee-spouse's life estate is a terminable interest because it
will terminate upon the death of the transferee-spouse.105 It does not qualify for
the marital deduction (i.e., it is nondeductible) because the remainder will pass
to the transferor's children without consideration.' 0 6 If, however, the
transferor's children obtained the remainder interest by purchasing it from the
transferor-instead of by gift from the transferor-then the spouse's income
interest would qualify for the marital deduction, even though it is a terminable
interest. 107
In the case of lifetime transfers of a copyright, a surviving spouse's
termination rights become vested only if (1) the author does not exercise the
termination right before her death; (2) the spouse survives the author; and
(3) the spouse exercises the termination right while the window is still open.10
If any one of these conditions is not met, then the termination right in the
author's spouse evaporates. In Hypothetical 1, at the time of the gift byAuthor
to Person B, the interest of Author's spouse (the termination right) would
appear to be a terminable interest. It will cease to exist if, for example, Author
exercises his termination right, or if the spouse predeceases Author, or if the
other heirs refuse to join with the spouse in exercising the right.10 9
104.

See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER

ET AL., PROPERTY 226

(6th ed. 2006) (explaining that a

life estate with no remainder reverts back to the grantor or, if the grantor predeceases the life
tenant, to the grantor's heirs through the grantor's will).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(a)(3) (1994) ("Lif estates, terms for years, annuities,
patents, and copyr-ights are therefore terminable interests." (emphasis added)).
106. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1) ("Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event
or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed.").
107. It has been suggested that, in permitting a deduction for the value of the life estate in
an example like this, the Internal Revenue Code inadvertently creates gaming opportunities for
taxpayers. See David A. Handler & Deborah V. Dunn, RPM Trusts: Turning the Table on
Chapter 14, TR. & EST., July 2000, at 31, 39 ("In an RPM Trust, the grantor will not hold an
interest in the property both before and after the transfer, and thus Sec. 2702(a) would not
apply.").
108. See 17 U. S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2006) ("The fuiture rights that will revert upon termination
of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has been served .... The
rights vest in the author, authors, and other persons named in, and in the proportionate shares
provided [by the statute].").
109. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1) (2006) ("Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed."); see also Rev. Rul.
82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 (indicating that, where the spouse must make an election in order to
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Furthermore, in Hypothetical 1, Author receives no consideration for the
transfer, and so the marital deduction would not be alwd110 For that reason,
the transfer of the termination rights to Author's spouse should not qualify for
the gift tax marital deduction."'
Note that the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) has embraced a caselaw exception to the terminable interest rule where the transferee spouse is
given an elective right to take the donor's (or decedent's) property."' The
Service permits a deduction even though the property would pass to a third
party without consideration if the spouse allowed a lapse to occur. "' While
this exception probably would not be available in the copyright context, the
contours of the authorities are illuminating.
4
the United States Tax Court
In Estate of Mackie v. Commissioner,"1
addressed the question of whether a bequest to a surviving spouse at the

receive the interest, it must be unconditionally exercisable by the spouse-nonterminable-in
order to qualify' for the marital deduction).
110. See I.R.C. § 2523(b)(1) (stating that a nondeductible interest arises when the author
"retains in himself, or transfers or has transferredfor less than adequate andfull consideration
in money or money's worth to any person other than such donee spouse" (emphasis added)).
I111. Cases decided under the estate tax rules suggest that where a spouse's interest is
subject to a condition precedent other than an election by the spouse, no marital deduction is
allowed. Absent any direct gift tax authority on point, however, the estate tax law supplies
guidance because courts must interpret estate and gift tax laws in pani materia. See, e.g.,
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945) (' [Tihe gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax.
The two are in pari material [sic] and must be construed together. "' (quoting Estate of Sanford
v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939))); Comm'r v. Weymyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (noting
that "Congress directed [the estate and gift tax laws] to the same purpose, and they should not
be separated in application"); cf Natchez v. United States, 705 F. 2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983)
(applying a gift tax rule to an estate tax question in part because of "the Supreme Court's
consistent rulings that the estate tax and gift tax are to be construed in pani materia" (citations
omitted)). On conditions precedent, see Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 ("A cash bequest in
lieu of a life estate, payable unconditionally at the election of a surviving spouse within a
reasonable time after the decedent's death qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction under
section 2056 of the Code.").
112. See Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 (incorporating Mackie and Neugass into the
decision to allow a deduction despite the existence of a terminableinterest). Both of these cases
are discussed at length infra.
113. See Estate of Mackie v. Comm'r, 545 F.2d 883, 884 (4th Cir. 1976) (allowing the
deduction despite the fact that "a person other than the surviving spouse could, under the terms
of the bequest, if Mrs. Mackie did not elect to take under item nine, come into the possession or
enjoyment of the property" without consideration).
114. See Estate of Mackie v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 308, 310 (1975) (declining to accept the
Commissioner's argument that "the possibility of [Petitioner's) failure or refusal to accept,
coupled with the gift over in such an eventuality," meant the bequest was not entitled to the
deduction), afd, 545 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1976).

STICKY COPYRIGHTS

445

spouse's election qualified for the marital deduction."15 In Mackie, the
decedent bequeathed certain property to his wife and gave her the right to select
from the estate other property, so that the total value of the property she
received equaled the full estate tax marital deduction." 6 The only restraint on
Mrs. Mackie's interest was that her election must occur within four months of
the decedent's date of death.' 17 If Mrs. Mackie failed to make the election, she
8
would be deemed to have rejected the bequest."
The Service asserted a deficiency against the estate on the grounds that the
bequest to Mrs. Mackie did not qualify for the marital deduction." 9 The
taxpayer argued that Mrs. Mackie acquired a "vested indefeasible interest" in
the bequest as of the moment of her husband's death, and that the election was
a mere formality for "perfection" of that interest. 120 In finding for the taxpayer,
the court reasoned that Mrs. Mackie's interest was not subject to a condition
precedent, and as such, it qualified for the marital deduction.'12 ' The court
explained that Mrs. Mackie was in the same position as a surviving spouse who

is disinherited and subsequently elects against the will.' 22 If amounts passing
pursuant to an election against a will qualified for the marital deduction,
amounts passing pursuant to an election under a will should, too, the court
reasoned.123 Because Mrs. Mackie's right, like a statutory right of election, was
115. See id. (ruling in favor of petitioner despite the Commissioner's characterization of
the will as a "conditional bequest" that was terminable and "non-deductible").
116. See id. at 309 (describing the will's instruction that the wife should have "properties
to be selected by her .. , equal in total value to the remainder of the said maximum deduction or
exemption so computed").
117. See id (repeating the will's provision that the "election she shall make by a statement
in writing to that effect delivered to [the testator's] executrix within four months from the date
of [the testator's] death").
118. See id. (quoting that "failure of [testator's] said wife to deliver such statement to
[testator's] executrix within such time shall be deemed an election by her to reject this devise,
bequest and appointment in full").
119. See id at 310 (repeating the Commissioner's argument that "the possibility of
[petitioner's] failure or refusal to accept, coupled with the gift over in such an eventuality,"
meant the bequest was not entitled to the deduction).
120. Id
121. See id. at 313 (distinguishing bequests held nondeductible "because conditioned on
the beneficiary's performance of acts in addition to merely accepting the bequest" that "had
independent legal significance and constituted substantive limitations both on the power of
acceptance and on the interest transferred").
122. See id at 312 ("Mrs. Mackie was put in the same position as a disinherited surviving
[Here] her right of election is
spouse who is given a statutory right of election. ....
encompassed by the will rather than by statute, but we perceive this to be a difference without a
distinction." (citations omitted)).
123. See id. (noting the "difference without a distinction" between statutory election and
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unqualified, the property passing to her was eligible for the marital

deduction.124

Like Mackie, the decedent in Estate of Neugass v. Commissioner'25
bequeathed property to his surviving spouse at the survivor's election.' 26 In
Neugass, the decedent owned a substantial art collection.127 In his will, he
bequeathed to his wife a life estate in the artwork and gave her the right,
exercisable within six months of his death, to "elect to take absolute ownership
of any item, whereupon said item shall become the absolute property of my
wife."128 Upon the death of the wife, a life estate in the art would pass to the
decedent's daughter, if living, or if not, to a named charity.129 Mrs. Neugass
did in fact elect to take absolute ownership of certain of the artwork, and the
executors of the estate claimed a marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2056(b) for
the value of the artwork passing outright to Mrs. Neugass.130 The taxpayer
appealed from the. Tax Court's disallowance of the estate tax marital
3
deduction.'1 '
In finding for the taxpayer, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned that Mrs. Neugass received an alternative bequest (i.e.,
either a life estate or outright ownership).132 The court rejected the Service's

right of election conferred in a will).
124. See id. at 314 ("Mrs. Mackie was given the absolute right to take outright a specified
portion of decedent's estate ... the property which she received passed to her within the
meaning of section 2056(a) and (e) and did not constitute a terminable interest within the
meaning of section 2056(b).").
125. See Estate of Neugass v. Comrn'r, 555 F.2d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 1977) (deciding that
"[tihe statutory policy governing the disposition of the 'elective share' cases is applicable to the
testamentary election situation as presented here' and ordering judgment for the taxpayer).
126. See id. at 327 ("The decedent's will .. , gave Mrs. Neugass the choice between a life
use of the 'collection' . . . or the vested indefeasible interests ofabsolute ownership of any or all
of the items she selected. ... ).
127. See id. at 323 (recognizing the claimed value of the part of the art collection chosen
by spouse as $383,495.00).
128. Id at 323 n.2.
129. See id. at 323 n.1 (quoting the will as directing "life use of said collection" to the
daughter upon death of the wife and to the charity should the daughter not survive the wife).
130. See id. at 323 ("Ludwig Neugass' executors claimed a marital deduction in the amount
of $682,605.12 including $383,495.00 for the value of the works of art of which decedent's
widow elected to take absolute ownership.").
131. See id. at 325 ("[Ajppellants seek a determination by this court that the interest
acquired by Mrs. Neugass pursuant to Article FIFTH was an alternative or elective bequest and,
as such was a non-terminable interest which qualified for the marital deduction.").
132. See id. at 327 ("[W]e are of the opinion that Mrs. Neugass had, under the provisions
of the decedent's will, a mere election between alternatives.").
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133
plea to disregard Mackie as "contrary to controlling legal principles."
Instead, the court likened the Neugass case to Mackie, explaining that Mrs.
Neugass, like Mrs. Mackie, faced a choice, and alternate bequests, on their
face, did not preclude eligibility for the estate tax marital deduction.13 4 The
court drew on evidence that the testator intended to provide his wife with
"maximum flexibility,"' 35 that he intended the bequest to qualify, for "as fuill a
marital deduction as the law allowed,"136 and that Mrs. Neugass became
37
entitled to absolute ownership of property from the decedent's estate .'1
The Service has embraced these cases. 138 In doing so, the Service
emphasizes that the transferee spouse must be given an absolute right to take
the property, and that the election must in fact be made within a reasonable
time after the transfer giving rise to the right of election. 139 In Hypothetical 1,
the spouse's termination rights cannot be exercised for a period of years and so
any election is deferred until the window opens. Moreover, the transfereespouse's termination rights are contingent upon survivorship of Author and
Author's nonexercise of the right.'140 Thus the Neugass-Mackieexception to the
terminable interest rule likely would not apply to copyright termination rights.

133. See id. ("'Comssioner ... contends that Mackie and this case are contrary to our
opinion in [Allen], and the 'controlling federal legal principles.'
Allen, however, is
distinguishable from both.").
134. See id. at 326 ("The indication is then clear that Article FIFTH did not contain,
explicitly or impliedly, a power of appointment, but instead an alternative bequest.").
13 5. Id.
136. Id.
137. Idat327.
138. See Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 (using Mackie and Neugass as support for the
adoption of this exception to the terminable interest rule).
139. See id. ("A cash bequest in lieu of a life estate, payable unconditionallyat the election
of the surviving spouse within a reasonable time after the decedent's death qualifies for the
estate tax marital deduction under section 2056 of the Code." (emphasis added)).
140. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1) (2006) ("[Q1n the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event
or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail. .. ."). Because the transferee-spouse's termination
rights depend upon (a) Author having a right of survivorship from the transfer to Person B and
(b) Author failing to exercise the termination right for himself, the transferee-spouse cannot be
said to have a "nonterminable" interest. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the general rules
applicable to gifts).
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c. Consequences of ailing to Qualifyfor the Available
Exclusions andDeductions
Because copyright termination interests likely will not qualify for the
annual exclusion or the gift tax marital deduction,14 ' any deemed transfer of
termination rights by the author will be fully taxable.142 So in Hypothetical 1,
when Author makes a lifetime gift of a copyright to Person B, assuming that he
is the deemed transferor of the termination rights,143 he makes a taxable gift of
the interest transferred to PersonB,'"4 and that transfer is eligible for the annual
exclusion.14 5 In contrast, any gift of the termination right-a future interestwill not qualify for the annual exclusion.14 6 The failure to qualify the
termination rights for the annual exclusion is another example of how copyright
141. How might a giving or selling author overcome the problem that a spouse's copyright
termination interest is terminable? Consider this hypothetical:
Hypothetical 1.5. Author is married and has two adult children. Author already
applied his maximum unified credit to prior lifetime transfers. On January 1,2009,
each of Author and his wife made a $13,000 annual exclusion cash gift to their
child, Adult DaughterA. Taxpayer is the creator and owner ofa copyright having a
fair market value of $20,000. Author wants to make a gift of the copyright to Adult
DaughterA, but he is concerned that the termination rights that arise in the spouse
(Adult DaughterA's mother) would not qualifyv for the marital deduction. Author
sells the copyright to Adult DaughterA for $20,000 minus x. Adult DaughterA
pays her mother x for the mother's copyright termination interest that will arise on
account of the sale.
Assume (however unrealistically for discussion purposes) that $20,000 represents adequate and
full consideration for all interests in the copyright. Although a sale ordinarily might take a
transaction outside the scope of the nondeductible terminable interest rule, federal copyright law
prevents the mother from divesting herself from her copyright termination rights. 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(1 )-(2) (2006). Thus, the same problem would arise ifAuthor sold the copyright to his
spouse, and the spouse paid Adult Daughter A for the daughter's termination interest.
142. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (setting the value of the taxable estate after deducting certain
property passing to the surviving spouse). The statute provides:
[T]he value of the taxable estate shall .. . be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to
the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.
Id. Because no deductions apply to the transfer of termination rights, they will be taxable in
full. Id.
143. Supra note 71 and accompanying text.
144. See Treas. Reg. § 25.25 12-1 (as amended 1992) ("[Ihf a gift is made in property, its
value at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift. The value of the property
is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller

...

145.
146.

I.R.C. § 2503(b).
Supra Part III.B.4.a.
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owners are treated more harshly for tax purposes than are other property
owners. The law should not support this discrimination. Furthermore, given
how difficult it is to allocate value between the copyright transferee and the
holders of the termination rights,14 7 administration of a gift tax on the transfer
of termination rights would be extremely complex. The next section considers
the possibility that a disclaimer could be used to avoid these difficulties.
5. Planning with Sticky Copyrights
Because of the unique nature of copyrights, many standard tax planning
techniques will be unavailable. Consider, for example, the use of disclaimers.
Disclaimers are a standard feature of any post-mortem tax plan.14 8 Used
correctly, disclaimers can prevent a gift from occurring in order to avoid an
adverse tax result.14 9 Generally speaking, a disclaimer causes property to pass
as if the disclaimant had predeceased the transferor.15 0 But disclaimers have no
application to termination rights.' 5' By law, termination rights are not
alienable,152 and therefore statutory heirs may not disclaim them. 5 13 A gift of
147.

Supra note 88 and accompanying text.

148.

See generally Mitchell M. Gans, Disclaimers,46 INST. ON FED. TAx'N § 52.01 (1988);

Steve R. Akers, Postmortem PlanningConsiderations: A Review of Income, Gift, and Estate
Tax PlanningIssues, SNO ALI-ABA 1211 (2007) (explaining the many uses of disclaimers in
postmortem planning).

149. See

DtJKEMINIER ET AL.,

supra note 36, at 132 ("The most common motivations for

disclaimer are to reduce taxes or to keep property from creditors."); see also Jewett v. Comm'r,
455 U.S. 305, 310 (1982) ("[T]he practical effect of petitioner's disclaimers was to reduce the
expected size of his taxable estate and to confer a gratuitous benefit upon the natural objects of
his bounty.").

150.

See

DTJKEmiNIER ET AL.,

supra note 36, at 133 ("[A]lmost all states have enacted

disclaimer legislation that provides that the disclaimant is treated as having predeceased the

decedent."); see also UNIF.

PROBATE CODE § 2-1

106(b)(3)(B) (2006) ("If the disclaimant is an

individual, except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (C) and (D)), the disclaimed interest
passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time of distribution.").
15 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (naming all the procedures for postmortem
transfer of termination rights without allowing for disclaimers).
152. See id. § 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any futture grant.").
But see Allison M. Scott, Oh Bother: Milne, Steibeck, and an Emerging Circuit Split over the
Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 368 (2007) ("The
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the termination provisions of the Copyright Act and their
interaction with state contract law has created tension between Ninth Circuit courts and Second
Circuit courts with respect to the question of the alienability or inalienability of termination
rights.").
153. See I.R.C. § 2518 (2006) (defining a disclaimer as a method by which a transferee
rejects an interest given by a transferor, thus disqualifying the inalienable termination interest
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copyright termination interest, then, is a gift that one must accept. Thus a
taxable gift of termination rights may not be defeated by disclaimer. In
addition, as Part IV discusses, the value of the termination right may be
included in the giving author's gross estate at the giving author's later death.'5
This is to be contrasted with the inter vivos gift of an ordinary (i.e.,
noncopyright) asset, where the donor can prevent post-gift appreciation from
being included in the gross estate. In this sense, copyrights are particularly
sticky from a transfer-tax perspective.
C The Selling Author and the Derivative Gift Syndrome
Moving away from a scenario in which an author makes a wholly donative
transfer of a copyright, consider next an author who sells to a third party a
copyright or an interest in a copyright. Somewhat counterintuitively, such a
sale is partially sticky for gift tax purposes. The author makes a taxable gift of
the heirs' termination rights. To illustrate, consider this variation on
Hypothetical 1:
Hypothetical 2. Author is the creator and owner of a copyright having a

fair market value of $20,000. On February 1, 2009, in an arm's-length
transaction with a third party (Buyer), Author sells the copyright in return
for a payment of $19,000 cash. The price is discounted to account for the
termination rights, which are worth $ 1,000.
Hypothetical 2 involves three separate property interests: the copyright itself,
Author's termination rights, and the heirs' termination rights.' 55 As in the case
of the wholly donative transfer in Hypothetical 1, when Author sells the
copyright to Buyer on February 1, 2009, Author may be deemed to retain 5 a
termination right for himself' 56 and transfer a termination right to his heirs.'1 1
Those rights allow Author or his heirs to terminate the prior transfer to
Buyer. 51 8 If Author dies before the exercise period without terminating the sale,
from the category). A qualified disclaimer causes the disclaimed property to pass directly from
the initial transferor, not the disclaimant. Id. § 2518(a).
See infra Part IV (analyzing estate tax treatment of copyright interests).
See supra Part 11 (discussing termination rights of authors and their heirs).
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (establishing an author's right to terminate the transfer of
a copyright interest).
157. See supra Part III.B. 1 (explaining that federal copyright law creates a termination
right in the author and his heirs upon the author's transfer of the copyright).
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) ("Where an author is dead, his or her termination is owned,
and may be exercised, as follows. .. ."). They may be exercised beginning on February 1,
2044, until February 1, 2049. At any time after February 1, 2034 (ten years before the
154.
155.
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and his widow and adult children survive him, then Author's surviving spouse
and children own-and may exercise-the termination rights." 9
We turn now to the question of whether an author makes a gift-taxable
transfer of the termination right when the author sells a copyright to a third
party. Recall that in DiMarco, the court held that a gift requires an element of
voluntariness. 10In that case, employment alone was an insufficient basis for
finding that the decedent had made a gift of a survivor's benefit under an
employee pension plan.'16 ' In Hypothetical 2, Author sells a copyright to a third
party, giving rise to termination interests, presumably worth $1,000. Arguably
the facts of Hypothetical 2 are distinguishable from the wholly donative transfer
in Hypothetical 1, insofar as Author receives payment for the copyright. Author
either will consume the amount realized from Buyer or own it at the time of his
162
death (causing inclusion in Author's gross estate).
In Hypothetical 1, it seems fairly clear that Author engages in voluntary
transfer of wealth to Person B sufficient to make the termination rights
conferred on the heirs subject to the gift tax. The transfer in Hypothetical 2 is
entirely different. In Hypothetical 2, Author does not set out to make a gift. To
the contrary, Author sells the asset for its value and only indirectly confers
rights on his or her heirs. Author's primary motivation appears to be the
economic benefit from the copyright, not a gift to his heirs. In this sense,
Hypothetical 2 is closer to DiMarco(although it is not clear). If this analysis is
correct and Hypothetical 2 is analogous to DiMarco, then no gift should be
deemed to occur in connection with the sale to Buyer.163 Table A summarizes
commencement of the exercise period), but no later than February 1, 2042 (two years prior to
the expiration of the exercise period), Person B must receive written notice of the intent to
exercise the termination right. See id § 203(a)(4) ("[T]ermination shall be effected by serving
an advance notice in wrting .... ")
159. See id § 203(a)(2) (listing all the possible heirs of the termination right upon author's
death).
160. See Estate of DiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653,663 (1986) (noting that a taxable gift
can only occur when there is "an act of transfer by the donor; and there can be no act of transfer
unless the act is voluntary and the transferor has some awareness that he is in fact making a
transfer of property").
161. See id (rejecting the idea that "the simple act of going to work for an employer that
has an automatic, non-elective, company-wide survivors income benefit plan . . . constitutes a
'transfer' of an interest in the benefit for either estate or gift tax purposes").
162. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2006) ("The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including ...the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated."). If Author consumes the fuill amount realized by the
sale of the copyright to Buyer prior to death, it will not be included in this time-of-death
valuation.
163. See DiMarco, 87 T.C. at 663 (holding that no gift took place).
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the tax consequences of the lifetime transfers of copyrights discussed in this
Part.
Table A: Gift Tax Consequences of Copyright Transfers
Will gift tax be imposed on...
...
.value of copyright transferred?
...
.value of termination interest created in

author?
..value of termination interest created in
author's spouse?
..value of termination interest created in
author's heirs (other than spouse)?

Tye of Author
Hoarder Giver Seller
n/a
Yes
No
n/a

No

No

na

Yes

Maybe

n/a

Yes

Maybe1

The next Part considers the estate tax consequences of transfers of copyrights.
IV. Estate Taxation of CopyrightInterests
Copyrights are freely transferable by will.'16 Although heirs may have the
right to terminate any of the decedent's lifetime transfers, if certain conditions
are met,'165 they have no ability to terminate any testamentary transfers made by
an author.'166 When an author dies, the value of all copyrights or interests in
copyrights owned by the author will be included in her gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes.167 Generally, copyrights have an estate tax value equal to
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (excluding transfer by will from the provisions of the
statute).
165. Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
166. Supra Part HII.B.5.
167. See .R.C. § 2033 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."); see also Treas.
Reg. § 20.203 1-1(b) (as amended in 1965) ("The value of every item includible in a decedent's
gross estate. ...
is its fair market value at the time of decedent's death, except ... ifthe executor
elects the alternate valuation mehod . .. ."). Fair market value is "the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Id.
The valuation necessarily will take into account the time-limited nature of the copyright;
between otherwise identical time-limited rights and rights unlimited in duration, the timelimited rights will be less valuable. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S.
546, 556 (1993) ("Intangible assets such as patents and copyrights are depreciable over. their
'legal ives,' which are specified by statute."). Therefore, the wealth transfer tax value of a
copyright should reflect its limited duration.
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their fair market value as of the decedent's date of death or as of the alternate
valuation date, if the executor so elects. 16 8 This Part considers what amount, if
any, will be included in the estate of a hoarding author, a giving author, and a
selling author. The estate tax consequences are different in each case and may
depend on the time of the author's death in relation to the termination period.
A. The HoardingAuthor and the Estate Tax MaritalDeduction
In the case of an author who dies without having made any lifetime
transfers of copyrights, tax-free treatment of an author's sizeable estate will
depend largely on the qualification of property in the estate for the marital
deduction.169 In order to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, a property
transfer must satisfy' four requirements, which are somewhat similar to the gift
17 0
tax marital deduction requirements:

168. See Treas. Reg. § 20.203 1-1 (b) (as amended in 1965) (explaining the fair market
value/alternate valuation method scheme). The alternate valuation date is six months after the
decedent's date of death. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032- 1(a) (as amended in 2005) (noting that
alternatively valuated property is valued either at the date it is sold "within six months" or at its
fair market value "six months" after decedent's death). For an example of the valuation of
copyright in an estate, see Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1295 (E.D.
Va. 1994). In that case, the district court approved the estate valuation of an author's copyrights
as the amount of revenue they were expected to produce, discounted for marketing and other
expenses, as well as the possibility that the copyrights would not be exploited. Id at 1287. For
a discussion of the challenges of valuing copyrights for estate tax purposes, see Bartow, supra
note 9, at 40 1. Professor Bartow explains: "The long term value of a previously unexploited
copyrighted work is exceptionally difficult to predict." Id Previously exploited works are more
susceptible to valuation, but challenges remain:
A copyright that is the subject of an exclusive license may generate easily
calculable royalties during the term ofthe license, but the license may expire or can
be terminated well before the end of the copyright term, posing valuation
complexities for the unlicensed interval. Copyrights that are nonexclusively
licensed provide some clues to their pecuniary merit based on past royaltygenerating performances, but valuing them is still fraught with uncertainties
because of the likelihood of changing societal tastes and desires throughout the
lengthy duration of a typical copyright. A copyrighted song, for example, may sell
many records, fade to obscurity, and then re-emerge more popular than ever
decades later on a trajectory impossible to accurately predict or easily plan for.
Id
169. See Jeffr~ey N. Pennell, Tax PaymentProvisionsand EquitableApporionment,SH092
ALI-ABA 593, 613 (2003) ("With an 'optimum' or unlimited marital deduction, any normal
estate tax imposed on the estate would be generated by property that did not qualify for the
deduction.").
170. Supra Part III.B.4.b.
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(1) The property must be included in the gross estate of the
decedent.
(2)

The property must "pass" from the decedent.

(3) The property must pass to the decedent's surviving spouse.
(4)

The property interest must not be a non-deductible terminable

interest.]7
Generally speaking, a terminable interest is one "which will terminate or fail on
the lapse of time or on the occurrence or the failure to occur of some
contingency."172 Examples of terminable interests include life estates and terms
of years. 7 Copyrights, too, are terminable interests. 7 Like a term of years, a
copyright interest lasts for a fixed period of time.175 But not all terminable
interests are nondeductible.176 Nondeductible terminable interests are those in
which:
(i) Another interest in the same property passed from the decedent to some

other person for less than adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, and

171. The Internal Revenue Code explains the restrictions as follows:
[T]he value of the taxable estate shall .. , be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to
the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.
I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-i (1958) ("A deduction is
allowed .. . from the gross estate of decedent for the value of any property interest which passes
from the decedent to the decedent's surviving spouse if the interest is a deductible interest .....
(emphasis added)).
172. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i(b) (as amended in 1994); see also I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)
("Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of
an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or
fail, no deduction shall be allowed."); supra notes 99-102 (discussing terminable interests).
173. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(b) (as amended in 1994) ("Life estates, terms for
years, annuities, patents, and copyrights are therefore terminable interests.").
174. Id.
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 3 02 (2006) (explaining that except in cases of works made for hire,
anonymous works, and pseudonymous works, copyrights in works created after January 1, 1978,
last for the life of the author plus seventy years).
176. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i (a) (as amended in 1994) ('Tlhe fact that an interest in
property passing to a decedent's surviving spouse is a 'terminable interest' makes it
nondeductible only ... under the circumstances described in paragraph (c) of this section,
and .. , if it does not come within one of the exceptions referred to in paragraph (d) of this
section.").
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(ii) By reason of its passing, the other person or his heirs or assigns may
possess or enjoy any part of the property after the termination or failure of
the spouse's interest.'7
Evaluating these criteria, the value of a copyright interest is included in a
hoarding author's gross estate. 178 If a hoarding author bequeaths a copyright to
her surviving spouse, then the interest will pass from the decedent179 and no
person other than the surviving spouse may possess or enjoy any part of the
copyright-by reason of the bequest-after the termination of the spouse's
interest.180 A bequest of a copyright to a surviving spouse, therefore, should
qualify for the marital deduction.
One might think that an author's lifetime gift of a copyright is subject to
gift tax, but not estate tax. But copyrights are "sticky" for both gift' 8' and estate
tax purposes.18 2 T he Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides no specific
rule for the estate taxation of copyright termination rights. The next section
considers statutory grounds for an argument by the Service that some value
associated with a copyright could be included in a deceased author's gross
estate. We consider three different scenarios: the author's death before,
during, and after the termination window.
B. The Giving Author Stuck on Copyrights
An author who gives an interest in a copyright simultaneously acquires a
termination right that is exercisable during a specified time-period after the
transfer.183 Recall Hypothetical 1, in which Author gives Person B a copyright
177. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(c) (as amended in 1994).
178. See I.R.C. § 2033 (2006) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
179. See id. § 2056(a) ("[T]he value of the taxable estate shall .. , be determined by
deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in
property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse ... );Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(a)- I (as amended in 1994) ("A deduction is allowed under section 2056 from
the gross estate of a decedent for the value of any property interest which passes from the
decedent to the decedent's surviving spouse if the interest is a deductible interest as defined in
§ 20.2056(a)-2.").
180. See I.R.C. § 205 6(a)(5) ("In the case of an interest in property passing from the
decedent .. , no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), be
considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.").
181. See supra Part 1I1.13 (discussing the relevant provisions that yield the conclusion that
an author's lifetime gift of a copyright is subject to a gift tax).
182. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of estate
tax statutes on copyrights).
183. Seel17 U. S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006) ("Termination of the grant may be effectd... at the
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on February 1, 2009. In that case, Author may exercise his termination rights
beginning on February 1, 2044, until February 1, 2049.'84 Author must do so
by delivering a written notice of the intent to exercise the termination right any
time after February 1, 2034 (ten years before the commencement of the exercise
period), but no later than February 1, 2047 (two years prior to the expiration of
the exercise period).185 This Part considers the estate tax consequences of the
giving author's death at three different points in time: before February 1, 2044;
between February 1, 2044, and February 1, 2049 (assuming all notice
requirements are met); and after February 1, 2049.
1. If the Giving Author Dies Before Termination Window Opens
If the giving author dies before the termination period, a portion of the
copyright's value may be included in his gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036
and/or I.R.C. § 2037. 186 There should be no estate tax inclusion under I.R.C.
§§ 203 3, 203 8, or 204 1.18 To begin the analysis, consider this noncopyright
example:
Hypothetical3. On February 1, 2009, Xtransfers property to Yfor a period

of thirty-five years. On February 1,2044, the property will revert to X, ifX
is then living, or if not, to X's estate.
In Hypothetical 3, if X dies before February 1, 2044, then the value of the
property, less Y's term interest, would be included in X's gross estate under
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).18 8 Under that section, "except in case of a bona fide sale
end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of
forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.").
184. Id
185. See id. § 203(a)(4)(A) ("The notice shall state the effective date of the termination,
which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and the
notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date.").
186. See I.R.C. § 203 6(a) (2006) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer. .. ."); id. § 2037(a) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time after
September 7, 1916, made a transfer. .. .)
187. See infra Part IVC.3 (discussing the reasons that I.R.C. § 2033 does not apply); infra
notes 214-18 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 2038); infra notes 219-28 and
accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 2041).
188. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property. .. if... possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent. .. ."); id § 2036(a)(2) (providing the
weaker claim that the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent that the
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for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth," the gross
estate includes the value of all property,
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has made a
transfer ... under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period that does not
end before89his death the possession, enjoyment, or right to income from, the

property.'1

An author's termination interest is like a reversionary interest insofar as the
author can repossess the copyright by delivering the requisite notice and
surviving until the termination period.' 9 0 If the author delivers the notice
during lifetime but dies before the window opened, the copyright would
become payable to the author's estate.' 9 ' Thus, just as with a reversionary
interest, the value of the giving author's copyright, less the value of the donee's
interest in the property, likely will be included in the author's estate under

I.R.C. § 2036. 192
Observe that the Code does not specify whether rights that arise by
operation of law (as opposed to the terms of a property transfer) are "retained"
19 3
interests for purposes of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) or I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).
Administrative rulings and case law provide some illumination. In Revenue
Ruling 2004-64, 114 the Service addressed the impact of an express trust term or
a local law that requires the trust grantor to be reimbursed for any income tax
decedent has retained 'the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom").
189. Id. § 2036(a)(1).
190. See id § 203 8(b) ("For purposes of this section, the power to alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate shall be considered to exist on the date of the decedent's death ...whether or not on
or before the date of the decedent's death notice has been given or the power has been
exercised.").
191. See id("[I1f. .. notice has not been given or the power has not been exercised on or
before the date of his death, such notice shall be considered to have been given, or the power
exercised, on the date of his death."). For that reason, survival until actual delivery of written
notice has the same legal effect as survival until actual termination.
192. Although Part IV.B.1 primarily discusses the application of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1),
I.R.C. § 203 6(a)(2) should apply as well.
193. See I.R.C. § 2036 (2006) (stopping short of discussing retained interests beyond
possession, the right to designate possession to others, and the right to vote). Note that the
meaning of retention for purposes of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) is not necessarily applicable to other
estate tax sections. Supra Part III.B.4.
194. Rev. Rul. 2004-64,2004-2 C.B. 7 ("When the grantor of a trust, who is treated as the
owner of the trust under subpart E, pays the income tax attributable to the inclusion of the
trust's income in the grantor's taxable income, the grantor is not treated as making a gift of the
amount of the tax to the trust beneficiaries.").
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attributable to the trust.' 95 In either case, the Service ruled, the full value of the
trust's assets is includable in the grantor's estate for purposes of .R.C.
§ 2036(a)(l ).19 6 Thus the Service considered irrelevant the issue of whether
"iretention" was accomplished by an affirmative provision in the instrument of
97
transfer or by reason of a state statute.1
In contrast to the position taken by the Service, there is case law that
suggests that rights conferred on a taxpayer solely by operation of state law do
not satisfy the retention requirement. In Wyly v. Commissioner,198 the decedent
transferred community property to an irrevocable trust that paid income to his
wife for life, remainder to be held in further trust for the couple's
grandchildren.199 Under applicable Texas law, the decedent had a community
property interest in the income from the trust. 200 The Fifth Circuit ruled that
rights bestowed on the decedent by state law did not constitute the retention of
a "right to income" for purposes of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1 ).20 1 In the Fifth Circuit
at least, then, explicit retention of a right-not a right arising by operation of
state law-is a condition precedent to estate tax inclusion under I.R.C.
§ 2036(a)( 1).202 But because the position taken by the Service in Revenue
195. See id. ("[W] hat are the gift tax consequences when the grantor pays the income tax
attributable to the inclusion of the trust's income in the grantor's taxable income, and... if,
pursuant to the governing instrument or applicable local law, the grantor may or must be
reimbursed by the trust. .. -.
196. See id ("If. .. the grantor must be reimbursed by the trust for the income tax payable
by the grantor that is attributable to the trust's income, the full value of the trust's assets is
includible in the grantor's gross estate under § 2036(a)(l).").
197. See id. ("If... the trust's governing instrument or applicable local law gives the
trustee the discretion to reimburse the grantor for that portion of the grantor's income tax
liability, the existence of that discretion ...will not cause the value of the trust's assets to be
includible in the grantor's gross estate.").
198. Wyly v. Comm'r, 610 F.2d 1282, 1294 (5th Cur. 1980) ("It is our conclusion that
§ 2036(a)(1) does not sweep the value of these transfers into the donor's gross estate.').
199. Id at 1285.
200. See id ("The crucial portions of that body of Texas law are those which cause the
income from the separate property of a spouse to be the community property of both spouses.").
201. See id at 1294 ("To summarize our review of federal and state law, we have held that
the donor's community property interest in the income produced by these transferred properties
is so limited, contingent, and expectant that it does not amount to a 'right to the income,' within
the Act... .)
202. See id. ("We do not believe that an interest, created solely by operation of law as the
unavoidable result of what was in form and within the intendment of the parties the most
complete conveyance possible, is a retention within the Act."); Comin'r v. Hinds, 180 F.2d 930,
932 (5th Cir. 1950) ("[Wjhether the income be regarded as separate property of the wife or as
community income from the wife's separate property, the taxpayer retained neither 'the
possession or enjoyment of, or the righrt to the income from,' the property so as to make
applicable Sec. 81 l(c)(1)(B3) ... ).
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Ruling 2004-64 points in the other direction, it is difficult to predict the tax
results with certainty. 0 Note also that the estate might argue that the decedent
never made the requisite transfer, in that rights were not volitionally conferred
on the heirs .2 04 Also, even assuming that the section can be triggered where the
decedent's rights are conferred solely by operation of law, I.R.C. § 2036 might
be inapplicable because it can apply only when a decedent makes a transfer. 0
Consider the application of I.R.C. § 2037 in the case of a giving seller who
dies before the termination window opens. Under I.R.C. § 2037, the value of a
decedent's gross estate includes the value of all property:
made a
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has. ...
transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, if(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership
of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the
propet.. . and the value of such reversionary interest
immediately before death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the
value of such property. 2
In effect, I.R.C. § 2037 includes in the decedent's gross estate transfers that are
§ 2037 to apply, four tests must
essentially testamentary in nature. 207 Fo ...
be satisfied. First, there must be a transfer by the decedent. 0 Second, the
heirs' "possession or enjoyment of the property" must be conditioned on
surviving the decedent .20 9 Third, the decedent must have "retained an interest
203. It is possible to reconcile Rev. Rul. 2004-264 with these cases. Compare Rev. Rul.
2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (positing the affirmative retention of the right to receive distributions
from the trust), with Hinds, 180 F.2d at 932 ("[T~he taxpayer retained neither 'the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to teicmfr,'heproperty. .. ."), and Wyly, 6 10 F.2d at 1294
("We have further held that the interest arises only by operation of a mandatory definition
contained in the Texas constitution which spouses may not circumvent, and that thus it is
neither 'retained' within the meaning of the Act, nor arisen 'under' the transfers concerned.").
204. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer. .. ." (emphasis added)).
205. See Estate of Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699,703 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[I.R.C. § 2036] is
clearly not triggered in this case because it only applies to a power retained by the grantor over
the income from property when he transferred it to another.").
206. I.R.C. § 2037(a).
207. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78 (1916).
208. I.R.C. § 2037(a).
209. Id. § 2037(a)(1); RicHARD B. STEPHENs ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE &GiFr TAxATioN
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in the property that may bring the property back to the decedent.""' 0 Fourth, the
value of the decedent's interest immediately before death must exceed five
21
percent of the value of the property. '
Unlike I.R.C. § 2036, I.R.C. § 2037 clearly contemplates that it may apply
even when the decedent's retained right arises by operation of law.21 Thus, the
decedent's termination right can result in inclusion under this section in that, as
the section requires, the decedent's spouse and heirs can only enjoy their rights
by surviving the decedent. Nonetheless, the section will not apply if the value
of the decedent's interest immediately before death is less than five percent of
the value of the copyright (inclusive of the value of the termination right). Nor
will it apply if the decedent is found not to have made a transfer because the
creation of the termination rights is nonvolitional in nature. 1
Under I.R.C. § 2038, the value of a decedent's gross estate includes any
interest in property of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
(except, as under I.R.C. § 2036, "in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth") where enjoyment of the
property was subject to the decedent's power to revoke, alter, amend, or
214
terminate.
Note that unlike I.R.C. §§ 2036 and 2037, I.R.C. § 2038 has no
retention requirement. A giving author in effect possesses a right to revoke the
interests of the transferee (with respect to the copyright) and the interests of his

or her heirs (with respect to the termination rights) at certain times.215 Should
this author die before the period for exercise of the termination right, however,
no amount should be included in the author's estate under I.R.C. § 2038,21 for,
unlike I.R.C. § 2036, I.R.C. § 2038 does not apply where the decedent's power
had been subject to an outstanding contingency at the time of death. 1 The
4.09[l] (8th ed. 2002).
210. I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2) (2006).
211. Id.
212. Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(f) (1958).
213. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the nonvolitional nature of termination rights).
214. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
215. Supra Part 11.
216. See I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1) (2006) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all propety... where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any
change through the exercise of a power. ...to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate. ......
"). The
statute also includes property in the gross estate "where any such power is relinquished during
the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death." Id As discussed earlier, the
imposition of gift tax requires some showing of voluntariness. Supra Part HI.B.2. This assumes
all relevant notice requirements have been met. Supra Part IL.
217. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (as amended in 1962) ("[Sjection 2038 is not
applicable to a power the exercise of which was subject to a contingency beyond the decedent's
control which did not occur before his death .... )
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requirement that the author be alive at the time the termination window
opens-a contingency that did not occur-precludes application of I.R.C.

§ 2038.21
Consider whether I.R.C. § 2041 might apply to the giving author who dies
before the termination period. Under I.R.C. § 2041, the value of a decedent's
gross estate includes "any property with respect to which the decedent has at
the time of his death a general power of appointment.",2 19 A general power of
appointment is any "power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his
estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate.",220 When a giving or selling
author transfers an interest in a copyright, federal copyright law creates in the
author the right to reappoint the property to himself or herself.22'1 But is a
copyright termination right a general power of appointment?
The Treasury Regulations define as outside the scope of 1.R.C. § 2041 any
power existing as of a decedent's date of death that is subject to conditions
precedent. 2 If a giving author dies before a copyright termination right is
exercisable, then the condition precedent has not been satisfied and no amount
should be included in the author's gross estate.22 To illustrate, consider this
example:
Hypothetical 4. X transfers property in trust, payable to Yupon request,

"when and if the Washington Nationals win a World Series during Y's
lifetime." Y dies without the Washington Nationals ever having won a
World Series.
In Hypothetical 4, Y's power is exercisable only if and when the Washington
Nationals win the World Series. Such a win did not occur during Y's lifetime
and, therefore, Ydoes not have a general power of appointment for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2041.22 By analogy, where a giving author transfers a copyright to
218. See id ("[S]ection 2038 is not applicable to a power the exercise of which was subject
to a contingency beyond the decedent's control which did not occur before his deah....
219. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
220. Id § 204 1(b)(1).
221. See supra Part Il (discussing the conditions under which an author may exercise his
right to terminate a transfer of the copyright).
222. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1997) ("[A] power which by its terms is exercisable only
upon the occurrence during the decedent's lifetime of an event or a contingency which did not
in fact take place or occur during such time is not a power in existence on the date of the
decedent's death."). For example, if a decedent was given a general power of appointment
exercisable only after he reached a certain age, only if he survived another person, or only if he
died without descendants, the power would not be in existence on the date of the decedent's
death if the condition precedent to its exercise had not occurred. Id
223. Id
224. Id
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another, that transfer is revocable if the author lives to deliver the requisite
225
termination notice.
If the giving author dies before the termination window
opens, the author could not have a general power of appointment. 2 The
results under I.R.C. § 2041 may be different, however, if the author dies during
or after the period of termination. 2 In addition, an argument also might be
made by the author's estate that I.R.C. § 2041 does not apply to a self-created

power. 228

Finally, I.R.C. § 2033 cannot apply given that the decedent could not
control by will the disposition of the termination right or any other interest in
the copyright at her death.22
2. If the Giving Author Dies During Periodof Termination
Consider next the tax consequences of a giving author's death during the
period in which she may exercise the termination right. In such a case,
inclusion in the author's gross estate may occur under these sections: I.R.C.
§§ 2036(a)(1), 2036(a)(2), 2037, and 2038 .230 To begin, consider these facts:
225. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that as long as notice is given,
the author can die before termination actually occurs and the copyright still becomes part of his
or her estate).
226. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1997) (explaining that only if the condition precedent
to the power of appointment has occurred can the decedent exercise that power).
227. See I.R.C. § 204 1(a)(2) (2006) ("[T~he power of appointment shall be considered to
exist on the date of the decedent's death ...whether or not on or before the date of the
decedent's death notice has been given or the power has been exercised.").
228. See Treas. Reg. § 20.204 1-1 (b)(2) (1997) ("For purposes of §§ 20.204 1-1 to 20.2041 3, the term 'power of appointment' does not include powers reserved by the decedent to himself
within the concept of sections 2036 through 2038."); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-16-032
(Jan. 19, 1989) ("Section 20.2041-1(b)(2) of the Estate Tax Regulations provides that, for
purposes of sections 20.2041-1 to 20.2041-3, the term 'power of appointment' does not include
powers reserved by the decedent to himself within the concept of sections 2036 to 2038.').
229. Infra Part IV.C. 1; see also Mitchell M. Gans et al., Postmortem Rights of Publicity:
The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J.
PocKET PART 203, 203, 206-09 (2008), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.
org/images/pdfs/658.pdf (discussing the disadvantages of a California state law that permits
descendible rights of publicity without limiting the decedent's ability to control the disposition
of any postmortem rights of publicity); Mitchell M. Gans et al., The Estate Tax Fundamentalsof
Celebrity and Control, 118 YALE L.J. Poc-KET PART 50, 51 (2007), available at
http://www.yalelawjoumnal.org/images/pdfs/709.pdf (stating that I.R.C. § 2033 "applies only
where the decedent has the ability to exercise post-death control").
230. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 316 U.S. 56, 60 (1942) (noting
that the power to appoint trust property to oneself does not require estate tax inclusion under the
predecessor statute to I.R.C. § 2033); see also infra Part III.B.3 (noting that a copyright
termination right does not require inclusion under I.R.C. § 2702).
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Hypothetical S. Author is the creator and owner of a copyright having a
fair market value of $20,000. On February 1, 2009, Author gives the
copyright to Person B and receives no consideration in return. Author dies
on February 2, 2044, when the termination window is open.
In Hypothetical 5, Author dies during the period in which the copyright transfer
could be revoked. Thus, if the estate is unable to sustain an argument based on
the elements of retention and transfer, inclusion in the gross estate should occur
under I.R.C. § 2036.31 In addition, without regard to the question of retention,
232
I.R.C. §§ 2037 and 2038 may app ly.

Consider next the potential application of I.R.C. § 2041 in the case of an
author who dies during the termination period. If, in Hypothetical 5,Author (as
opposed to copyright law) is deemed for estate tax purposes to have created the
233
termination right in herself, I.R.C. § 2041 likely does not apply.
3.

If the Giving Author Dies After Termination Window Closes

Consider next the tax consequences of a giving author's death after the
termination window closes. In such a case, different rules might trigger
inclusion in the author's gross estate.
Hypothetical 6. Author is the creator and owner of a copyright. On
February 1, 2009, Author gives the copyright to Person B and receives no
consideration in return. Author dies on February 1,2054 (five years after
the termination window closed), without having delivered any notice of
termination.
23 1. Note, however, that Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 does not contain a rule similar to that
found in Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2038- 1(b) and 20.2041-3(b), which makes irrelevant any conditions
precedent to the exercise. CompareTreas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (as amended in 2008) (referring to
retention, but not conditions precedent), with Treas. Reg. § 20.2038- 1(b) (as amended in 1962)
(making I.R.C. § 2038 inapplicable to "a power the exercise of which was subject to a
contingency beyond the decedent's control which did not occur before his death"), and Treas.
Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1997) (stating that a power "which by its terms is exercisable only upon
the occurrence during the decedent's lifetime of an event or a contingency which did not in fact
take place or occur during such time is not a power in existence on the date of the decedent's
death").
232. See Estate of Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1972) (indicating there is
no retention requirement under I.R.C. § 2038); Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(f) (indicating that
I.R.C. § 2037 applies even if retained right arises by operation of law).
233. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1961); I.R.C. § 2041(a)(1) (2006)
(stating that the value of the gross estate includes "property with respect to which a general
power of appointment created on or before October 21, 1942, is exercised by the decedent"); see
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(a)(2) (1997) ("If the power is a general power of appointment, the
value of an interest in property subject to such a power is includable in a decedent's gross
estate.").
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In Hypothetical 6, Author dies after the expiration of the period for exercise of
the termination righit. In that case, the passage of time has extinguished both
Author's termination right and any termination rights to which his heirs might have
succeeded. It is not likely that any amount will be included in Author's gross estate
under I.R.C. §§ 2033,3 2036,35 2037,23 or 2038.23 But consider the potential
gift tax consequences under I.R.C. § 25 14.23
Under I.R.C. § 2514, a general power of appointment is any power which is
exercisable in favor of the powerholder, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of

her estate .239 A lapse of a power is considered a release of the power .240 To the
extent that the value of the property subject to the lapse (in Hypothetical 6, the value
of the copyright) exceeds $5,000, the lapse triggers gift tax liability under I.R.C.
§ 251424 In Hypothetical 6, if the termination right is a power of appointment,
then the giving author's failure to exercise it would be treated as a taxable lapse (or

release) of a power of appointment, if the lapse is a completed

gift.242

Upon the

234. See supra note 230 (discussing how the power to appoint property to oneself does not
require estate tax inclusion under the predecessor statute to I.R.C. § 2033).
235. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (stating that the value of the gross estate includes any interest of
which the decedent has made a transfer under which he has retained "for any period which does
not in fact end before his death" possession, income or enjoyment of transferred property or the
right to designate possession, income from, or enjoyment of the property).
236. See id. § 2037 (providing for estate tax inclusion of transfers that, among other things,
become possessory' only by surviving decedent).
237. IfAuthor dies within three years of the expiration of the termination window, then the
full value of the copyright may be included in Author's gross estate. See id § 2035(a)
(providing for the inclusion of certain property in gross estate if the decedent "relinquished a
power with respect to any property, during the three-year period ending on the date of the
decedent's death").
238. See id. § 2514 (describing tax treatment of property subject to powers of appointment
and defining term).
239. See id § 2514(c) ("[T]he term 'general power ofappointment' means a power which
is exercisable in favor of the individual possessing the power. ...
his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate.").
240. See id. § 2041(b)(2) ("The lapse of a power of appointment created after October 21,
1942, during the life of the individual possessing the power shall be considered a release of such
power.").
24 1. Id. § 25 14(e). The statute says the following:
The lapse of power of appointment ... during the life of the individual possessing
the power shall be considered a release of such power. ...
only to the extent that the
property which could have been appointed by the exercise of such lapsed power
exceeds in value the greater of [$5,000 or 5% of the property subject to the power].
Id
242. See id. § 2511 (providing that gift tax is imposed on all direct and indirect gifts).
Because it is a completed gift, there is a potential double taxation issue, given that I.R.C. § 2702
sets the value of any retained interest at zero. See id. § 2702 ("The value of any retained interest
which is not a qualified interest shall be treated as being zero .");see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-
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giving author's subsequent death on February 1, 2054 (five years after the
termination window closed), the author would no longer possess a power of
appointment, so for estate tax purposes, there would be no estate tax inclusion under
I.R.C. § 204 1.241
C. The Selling Author ConfrontsEstate Tax
An author who sells or licenses an interest in a copyright faces many of the
estate tax challenges that a giving author does. The author's termination right is
exercisable during a specified period after the transfer. 244 This section explores the
estate tax consequences of a selling author's death before, during, and after the
termination period.
1. If the Selling Author Dies Before Termination Window Opens
Ifan author licenses a copyright to a third party and then dies before the time at
which she could exercise her termination rights, then I.R.C. § 2033 will include in
the author's estate the value of the author's anticipated royalties under the license. 4
If, for example, the author sold a copyright in return for a right to receive $ 1,000 per
year for twenty years, and the author died after the first year of the transfer, then the
6(a) (1992) (providing additional adjustments to mitigate double taxation where the amount of
the transferor's property was previously determined under I.R.C. § 2702). It might also be
noted that if the author received consideration in exchange for allowing the termination interest
to lapse, then the ordinary-course-of-business exception might be applicable. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-8 (the bona fide exception). So, for example, where an author licenses a copyright
and then decides to allow the termination interest to lapse because she wishes to retain the
valuable licensing fee, the ordinary-course-of-business exception should preclude a taxable gift
from occurring.
243. See I.R.G. § 2041 (a) (2006) ("The value of the gross estate shall include ...any
property with respect to which a general power of appointment .. , is exercised by the
decedent. ...
but the failure to exercise such a power or the complete release of such a power
shall not be deemed an exercise thereof."). Note that if the lapse occurs less than three years
before the decedent's death, then the gift tax paid on the taxable lapse is included in the
decedent's gross estate. See id. § 2035(b) ("The amount of the gross estate .. . shall be
increased by the amount of any tax paid .. ,. by the decedent or his estate on any gift made by the
decedent ... during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.").
244. Compare supra Part IV.B (describing the estate tax consequences when a giving
author dies before, during, or after the termination period), with supra Part IV.C (describing the
estate tax consequences when a selling author dies before, during, or after the termination
period).
245. See I.R.C. § 2033 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
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author's estate would include the present value (as of the author's date of death) of
the right to receive $19,000, the remaining payments due under the license

agreement. 246

Consider whether I.R.C. § 2033 requires inclusion of any value attributable to
the termination rights that could be exercised in the future by the author's heirs.24
Regardless of when a giving or selling author dies in relation to a prior copyright
transfer, the value of these termination rights should escape inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2033 by analogy to wrongfu death
benefits 2. 4 1 Recall that termrination rights arise in heirs only if the author is not alive
when they become exercisable .249 The Service has ruled that state law wrongful
death benefits are not included in a decedent's gross estate when the applicable
statute creates in the decedent's heirs-as opposed to the decedent's estate-a cause
of action that did not otherwise exist during the decedent's lifetime.2 5
In Maxwell Trust v. Commissioner,2 5 the United States Tax Court addressed
the question of whether the estates of two American citizens, killed in a plane crash
in Japan, should include the value of settlement proceeds received by their heirs in a
wrongful death action.25 In that case, thle court noted that under applicable local
246. See id § 2039(a) ("The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or other
payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of
contract or agreement..i, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was
payable to the decedent."). Upon receipt, these royalties become income of a decedent under
I.R.C. § 691(a) and are subject to unfavorable taxation. See id. § 691(a) (treating, for tax
inclusion purposes, "the rigt ... to receive an amount ... as if it had been acquired by the
estate or such person in the transaction in which the right to receive the income was originally
derived").
247. See id. § 2033 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
248. See Gans et al., The Estate Tax Fundamentals of Celebrity and Control, supra note
229, at 51 (stating that a decedent's ability to control an interest post-death is necessary for
estate tax inclusion under § 2033, and that, because a living person has no wrongfuil death claim
during life, damages received under such a claim are not included in that person's gross estate).
249. See supra Part Il (describing the termination rights of an author); see also I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (2006) (stating that the value of the estate includes any interest of which the decedent
has made a transfer under which he has retained "for any period which does not in fact end
before his death ...the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the property").
250. Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 C.B. 219 ("The decedent in his lifetime never had an interest
in either the right of action or the proceeds. Therefore, with respect to damages recoverable
under the Act, nothing passed from the decedent to the beneficiaries which would be includible
in his gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes.").
251. See Maxwell Trust v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 4.44,451 (1972), acq. in result, 1973-2 C.B. 2
(holding that because local law vested the rights to the wrongfuil death proceeds in the
dependents of the decedents and not in the decedents themselves, decedents' gross estates did
not include the value of the proceeds under I.R.C. § 2033).
252. See id. at 448 ("The dispute in this case under section 2033 turns upon whether the
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law, the decedents themselves had no such wrongful death claim against the airline
or the airplane manufacturer. 2 Because the local law "vested the rights to
[wrongful death claims] in the dependents of the decedents and not in the decedents
themselves or their estates," the court ruled that "section 2033 does not require
254
inclusion of the settlement proceeds in the gross estates of the decedents.f
Concededly, copyright tennination rights are different. Unlike wrongful death
damages, the author is entitled to the termination right during life (though subject to
the contingency that the author must survive until the rights are exercisable). This
difference, however, is not one of consequence. For whenever a right is
extinguished or otherwise disappears at the decedent's death, I.R.C. § 2033 cannot
255
appy.
i terms of I.R.C. § 2036, the Service likely would argue that the elements of
transfer and retention are present and the estate therefore should include not only the
present value of the royalty stream but also the present value of the termination
256
right. Because the author received valuable consideration, the estate likely would
decedents had at the time of their deaths a claim against BOAC and Boeing on account of the
airplane crash which passed to their estates.").
253. Id. at 451-52.
254. Id. at 45 1.
255. Helvering v. Safe Deposit, 316 U.S. 56, 60 (1942); Wadewicz v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.
925, 934-35 (1963).
256. Eisen & Biblin, supra note 10, at 7. Eisen and Biblin illustrate the effects of applying
I.R.C. § 2036, though they argue against its application on the ground that the element of
retention is absent. They use an example of an author (referred to as an "Entertainer") who dies
with a $21 million estate, comprised of $1 million in cash and a copyright catalogue "worth"
$20 million in copyrights. The Entertainer makes a prior transfer of some of the copyrights,
retaining a royalty interest valued, for illustration purposes, at $12 million at the time of the
Entertainer's death. Id. The Entertainer dies prior to the period in which he may exercise his
termination rights. Id Eight million dollars is the assumed date-of-death value of the proceeds
from a fictive future sale of the post-termination interest. Eisen and Biblin believe that
the only amount that should be subject to estate tax upon the Entertainer's death is
the $12 million. Under the willing buyer/willing seller test for measuring value, all
that a willing buyer would pay for the rights that the Entertainer had was $12
million. At the instant of the Entertainer's death, if his estate attempted to sell its
entire interest in the copyrights to a third-party purchaser, all that purchaser could
acquire would be the right to receive royalties until a termination took place. No
additional rights could be acquired from the Entertainer's estate. * **
The IRS might not agree with the above result. In the above example, $8 million of
value was excluded from the Entertainer's estate. The half of this amount that will
be enjoyed by the surviving spouse would have been sheltered by the marital
deduction in any event, but the $4 million of value that went to descendants
effectively "escaped the system." The IRS might argue that estate tax inclusion
should result under Section 2036 on the theory that the situation is analogous to a
taxpayer transferring assets but retaining the income for himself. The problem with
this argument is that the Entertainer never made a "transfer" of assets to his
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invoke the bona fide sale exception. If the estate could establish that the decedent
had received full and adequate consideration, the exception would apply and I.R.C.
§ 2036, as well as I.R.C. §§ 2037 and 2038, would be rendered inapplicable
(enabling the estate to sidestep the retention and transfer issues). Although the
scope of the exception is unclear, and there is no authority applying the exception in
this context, it would seem to be unavailable on the rationale that the author did not
receive full consideration.
The courts disagree on the precise meaning of the phrase "adequate and full
consideration." One approach, adopted by courts in United States v. Allen in the

Tenth

Estate of Gregory V. Commissioner in the United States Tax
and Gradow v. UnitedStatesin the Federal Circuit,1 requires deeet

Circuit1

Court, 258

descendants. The descendants' rights were granted to them by Congress by virtue of
the copyright law, and not by a transfer from the Entertainer.
Id. (citations omitted).
257. See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916,917 (10th Cir. 1961) (finding that payment of
fair market value for the life estate constitutes adequate and fuhll consideration). In Allen, the
decedent created a trust from which she was to receive thre-fifths of trust income and her children
were to receive two-fifths of trust income. Id. at 916. Upon her death, the trust assets would pass
to her children. Id. At the age of 78, Mrs. Allen sold her income interest (having a stipulated value
of $135,000) to her son in a bona fide sale for $140,000. Id.at 916-17. The decedent died shortly
thereafter. Id at 917. The Service argued that three-fifths of the trust corpus, less the $140,000,
should be included in Mrs. Allen's gross estate. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that three-fifths of the value of the trust corpus should be included in her estate,
on the grounds that, "[it seems certain in a situation like this, Congress meant the estate to include
the corpus of the trust or, in its stead, an amount equal in value." Id.at 918. Practically speaking,
A llen's effect is to require a grantor of a trust who wishes to minimize estate tax to sell that life
estate for more than its fair market value. This in turn raises the possibility that the purchaser
would be deemed to make a gift to the grantor. For a discussion ofAllen, see Mitchell M. Gans &
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A CriticalAnalysis & PlanningSuggestions, 100 TAX NOTES,
Sept. 1, 2003, at 1153, 1166 (2003) ("[T]he court held that the grantor does not receive full
consideration within the meaning of the exception unless she receives an amount equal to what
would have been included in the gross estate had the sale not occurred.').
258. See Estate of Gregory v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 10 12, 1016 (1963) (finding that "adequate and
full consideration" requires "a comparable value which would be includable in the transferor's
gross estate"). In Gregory,the decedent's husband predeceased her, leaving a will that allowed the
widow to either take under her share of the couple's community property or take under the will. Id
at 1013. Mvrs. Gregory elected to take under the will, receiving personal effects, a probate
homestead and family allowance, and an income interest in a trust funded by her husband's share of
the community property and her share of the couple's community property, which she was required
as a condition of the will to transfer to the testamentary trust. Id. at 1014-15. The parties
stipulated that Mrs. Gregory's income interest in the community property ofher husband was worth
$11,926.96; the value of her share of the community property, which she transferred to the
testamentary trust, was $65,925.08. Id at 1017. The Tax Court ruled that the amount Mrs.
Gregory was deemed to receive ($11,926.96) was far less than what she transferred ($65,925.08),
and that therefore, her estate should include the value of the property she transferred to the trust,
measured as of Mrs. Gregory's date of death, less the consideration she received. Id at 1021-22.
259. See Estate ofGradow v. United States, 11ICl. Ct. 808, 816 (1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 516
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who sold a partial interest in property to receive a consideration equal to the fair
market value of the fee interest, not just the partial interest that is the subject of the
sale, in order for the bona fide exception to apply. The other approach, adopted by
courts in United States v. Wheeler in the Fifth Crit 2 'EsaeoMagnin V.
Commissioner in the Ninth Circuit 2 6' and D'Ambrosia v. Commissioner in the
Third Circui, 262 requires a taxpayer to receive a consideration equal to the fair
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding "adequate and full consideration" in "the property which would otherwise
have been included in her gross estate by virtue of her retention of a life estate"). In Gradow, the
decedent's husband predeceased her, leaving a will that allowed the widow to either take under her
share of the couple's community property or take under the will. Id Mrs. Gradow elected to take
under the will, receiving an income interest in a trust funded by her husband's share of the
community property and her share of the couple's conmnunity property, which she was required as
a condition of the will to transfer to the testamentary trust. Id The parties stipulated that Mrs.
(3radow's income interest in the community property of her husband was worth $234,767; the
value of her share of the community property, which she transferred to the testamentary trust, was
$444,641. Id The Claims Court held, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed, that Mrs. Gradow's gross estate included the value of her community property
which she transferred to the trust under her husband's will. Id at 816. The Claims Court reasoned
that any other rule would contradict "Congress' judgment that transfers with retained life estates are
generally testamentary transactions and should be treated as such for estate tax purposes," and
permit an otherwise abusive transfer to escape taxation. Id.
260. See Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e hold that the
sale of a remainder interest for its actuarial value as calculated by the appropriate factor set forth in
the Treasury Regulations constitutes an adequate and full consideration under section 203 6(a).").
In Wheeler, the decedent sold to his sons a remainder interest in a ranch in which the decedent
retained a life estate. Id. at 75 1. The purchase price was determined by reference to the fair market
value of the entire property and accepted actuarial principles for determining the value of the
decedent's life estate. Id at 752. The sons paid the purchase price with an interest-bearing note
secured by the borrowers' personal guarantees. Id The decedent's executor did not include in his
gross estate any value with respect to the ranch, on the theory that the bona fide sale exception
under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) applied to the sale of the remainder. Id at 753. The Fifth Circuit
embraced the interpretation of "adequate and full consideration" in the gift tax context, and
pronounced the estate tax rule as follows: "[Uless a transfer that depletes the transferor's estate is
joined with a transfer that augments the estate by a commensurate (monetary) amount there is no
"adequate and full consideration" for the purpose of either the estate or gift tax." Id. at 762.
261. See Estate of Magnin v. Comm'r, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e hold that
'adequate and full consideration' is measured against the actuarial value of the remainder interest
rather than the fee-simple value of the property transferred to the trust."). In Magnin, the decedent
and his father agreed that decedent would bequeath his remainder interest in certain stock the
family business to the decedent's children in return for the father's agreement to fund atrust for the
decedent's beneft essentially giving the decedent a life estate in the family business. Id at 1075.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's finding in favor of the Service and remanded the case
for a determination ofwhether the value of the decedent's remainder interest was equal to the value
of the life estate-in other words, did the decedent receive adequate and full consideration for the
transfer. Id at 1082.
262. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Comim'r, 101 F.3d 309, 318 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that
sale of remainder interest for its fair market value constitutes "adequate and full consideration"). In
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market value of the partial interest that is the subject of the sale. Under this
approach, the focus is on whether the transfer effects depletion in the transferor's
estate. The exception becomes available because the consideration received for the
partial interest, together with the value of the retained interest, prevents depletion
from occurinlg.
Even under this more taxpayer-friendly line of cases, the exception will in all
likelihood not be available. 6 For the transfer consists not only of the copyright but
also of the termination right to the spouse and children. The person acquiring the
copyright does not pay any consideration for the value of the termination rights
conferred on the spouse and children. Thus, an author who sells a copyright does in
fact deplete her estate, rendering the exception unavailable. To illustrate, assume
the author conveys a copyright and receives $18 in an ann's-length transaction.
Assume further that the value of the termination right, measured at the time of the
conveyance, is $2, one half of which is attributable to the author's termination. right
and the other half of which is attributable to the termination rights conferred on the
author's spouse and children. Put differently, if under the copyright law the author
could convey the termination rights and the copyright the author would have
received $20. In these circumstances, the transaction results in depletion in that the
author transfers an asset having a value of $20 but has only $19 in assets after the
conveyance (the purchase price of $18 plus the $1 value of the author's termination
right). Thus, even under the taxpayer-friendly approach, the author's estate could
not qualify for the exception. Interestingly, however, with proper planning, the
transaction could be made to qualify for the exception. If the author's children and
spouse had paid the author $1 for their termination rights, the transaction would
have resulted in no depletion, thus permitting the estate to argue for the exception
under the taxpayer-friendly line of cases.
D 'Ambrosio, the decedent sold a remainder interest in stock for an annuity interest. Id at 311.
The parties stipulated that the remainder and the annuity had identical fair market values. Id.
The Third Circuit addressed the question of whether the decedent must receive the fair market
value of the interest she sold (in D'Ambrosia, a remainder interest) or the value of the fee simple
interest in the underlying property, for the bona fide exception under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) to
apply. Id at 312. The court found that the decedent must receive fuill and adequate
consideration for the property interest that she sold, not the underlying property. Id at 315.
The Third Circuit agreed with the Gregory court's statement that eligibility for the bona fide
exception under I.R.C. § 2036 requires the transferor to receive "comparable value which would
have been includable in the transferor's gross estate." Id. at 313 (quoting Estateof Gregory, 39
T.C. at 10 16). The Third Circuit rejected Gregory's application ofthat rule, however, insofar as
the Gregory court took a snapshot of value at the time of the transferor's death, instead of at the
time of the transfer. Id.
263. See Magnin, 184 F.3d at 1080 (defining "adequate and full consideration" in reference
to the value of the remainder interest transferred); Wheeler, 116 F.3d at 767 (same);
D'Ambrosio, 1010 F.3d at 318 (same).
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It is unlikely that I.R.C. § 2038 would apply to a selling author who dies prior
to the termination window. The author's rights are contingent upon surviving to the
point at which the termination right may be exercised. This contingency precludes
the application of I.R.C. § 2038. If the contingency were disregarded, this section
2
may not apply because of the bona fide eXCeption. 64
As is true with the giving author who dies prior to the termination period,
I.R.C. § 2041 should not apply to the selling author who dies before the term-ination
period.26 The copyright termnination right is not a general power of appointment
because the condition precedent (i.e., survival) has not been satisfied. 6
2. If the Selling Author Dies During Periodof Termination
A selling author who dies during the period for exercise of the copyright
termination interests should experience the same estate tax consequences as one
who dies before the period of termination, with one qualification. Because there is
no longer any outstanding contingency (the author survived to the point at which
she could exercise the termination right), I.R.C. §§ 2038 and 2041 can now apply.
3. If the Selling Author Dies After Termination Window Closes
If the selling author survives the termination period without exercising her
rights-te third scenario under consideration-then the termination rights
evaporate. 6 No value attributable to these rights should be includable in her gross
estate under I.R.C. § 2033.26 Furthermore, there should be no inclusion under
I.R.C. §§ 2036,2037, or 2038.26 As in the case of the giving author who dies after
the termination period, I.R.C. § 2041, standing alone, should not be sufficient to
trigger estate tax inclusion either.27
Supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
Supra Part IV.B. 1.
266. Supra Part IV.B. 1.
267. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006) (defining the extent of termination rights).
268. The remainder of Part IV.B3 considers alternate theories for estate tax inclusion.
269. As discussed earlier, the imposition of gift tax requires some showing of
voluntariness. See supra Part III.B-C (discussing the gift taxation of transfers of copyright
termination rights). Allowing the termination right to lapse should not cause I.R.C. § 2035 to
apply, even if death occurs within three years of the lapse, inasmuch as the lapse occurs without
any volitional act of transfer or relinquishment by the decedent at the time of the lapse. See
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 199935003 (May 18, 1999) (intimating that I.R.C. § 2035 cannot apply
in the absence of a volitional act).
270. The lapse of the power might be a taxable gift under I.R.C. § 2514. See I.R.C.
264.
265.
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Table B summarizes the estate tax consequences of the copyright transfers
discussed in this Part.
Table B: Estate Tax Consequences of Copyright Transfers27 1
Time of Author's Death

Will estate tax be imposed
on ...

(in relation to period when notice of

termination may be delivered)
Before

During

After

W

HC

)K

... under IRC § 2033?

*

*

*

... under IRC § 2036?

i

0

*

... under IRC § 2037?

0

0

+

0
*

*
*

Hoarding Author
Giving Author

... under IRC § 2038?
... under IRC § 2041?
Selling Author

... under IRC § 2033?

x

x

... under IRC § 2036?

0

0

*

... under IRC § 2037?

0

0

*

0

*

0

*

... under IRC § 2038?

... under IRC § 2041?

*

Key:

x
0

*

Estate tax imposed on some or entire value associated with
copyright
Under some circumstances and if certain assumptions are
correct, estate tax may be imposed on some or entire value
associated with copyright. See analysis infra.
No estate tax consequences

§ 2514(e) (2006) (discussing the lapse of a power of appointment). Note that ifthe lapse occurs
less than three years before the decedent's death, then the gift tax paid on the taxable lapse
would be includable in the decedent's gross estate. Id. § 2035(b). On the other hand, a selling
author, unlike a gifting author, may be able to argue that a lapse of termination does not create a
taxable gift by reason of the ordinary-course-of-business exception in Treas. Reg. 25.2512-8.
271. Assuming all relevant notice requirements satisfied.
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V Policy Concerns with Sticky Copyrights
Because federal copyright law uniquely grants an author the ability to
terminate a prior transfer, authors do not have the ability to fix the transfer tax
value of the donated property.2 7 Ordinarily, when a person makes a gift, the
transfer tax value of the gifted property is its fair market value as of the date of
the transfer.2 7 Because of the likelihood of the estate tax inclusion, however,
the author has no ability to fix the value of a copyright for wealth transfer tax
purposes at the time of the initial transfer.27 Although federal copyright law
aims to protect the author and her family members, 7 it actually limits an
author's ability to engage in tax-effective giving. There is seemingly little
rationale for this discrimination against copyrights relative to other types of
property.
The underlying policy goal of copyright termination rights is protection for
the author. Supporters of the revised federal copyright law explained that
termination rights were necessary "because of the unequal bargaining position
of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's
value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical compromise
that will further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the
problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved. 2 76 Motivated by the
desire to protect authors, Congress appears to have made it difficult, if not
impossible, for authors to engage in effective estate planning. The solicitude of
the legislature for creative individuals is salutary, but the unintended tax
consequences are not.27
Most authors and their advisors already understand the ability to "bump"
or disturb prior transfers with copyright termination rights, 7 but the

272. On the benefits of fixation of value generally, see Gans, supra note 11, at 765-87
(discussing rate, appreciation, and leverage benefits).
273. See I.R.C. § 2512(a) ("[T~he value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered
the amount of the gift.").
274. See supra Part IV (discussing estate taxation of copyright interests).
275. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DoNATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003) (claiming the purpose of the law of donative transfers is to "facilitate rather than
regulate").
276. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
277. For a critique of the unintended consequences of state legislation that creates
retroactive descendible rights of publicity, see Gans et al., Postmortem Rights of Publicity:-The
FederalEstate Tax Consequences of New State-Law PropertyRights, supra note 229, and Gans
et al., The Estate Tax Fundamentalsof Celebrity and Control, supra note 229.
278. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 19 (discussing the intersection of estates and copyright
law in "will-bumping").
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professional and scholarly literature is almost entirely silent on the wealth
transfer tax consequences of these rights. To date, the Service has not sought to
enforce any of the gift or estate tax consequences of sticky copyrights. This
may be for a variety of reasons including, perhaps, the failure of the Service
and taxpayers to appreciate all of the tax consequences.
If the wealth transfer tax consequences of copyright termination rights
were better understood, vigorous markets in copyright transfers would be
hindered by the tax system. For example, an author who apprehends that her
estate will include some residual value of any copyright sale may be
discouraged from making lifetime transfers. Enforcement of the wealth transfer
tax system would lead to an inefficient hoarding of intellectual property, as
creative individuals would seek to minimize their tax exposure. To the extent
that an author makes a decision to exploit (or not to exploit) a copyright based
on tax considerations, the law hinders rather than protects creative individuals.
Freedom of testation and economic efficiency are then impeded by overly
complex tax rules.
VI. Legislative Reform to Unstick Copyrights
Copyrights are not like other property, admittedly. But if termination
rights created by statute-a statute meant to protect authors and their heirsattract harsher transfer tax treatment than other assets, then the tax law should
be changed. Authors, like owners of other kinds of property, should be able to
gift or sell their assets without concern that termination rights will cause
adverse tax consequences. Equally important, authors should be able to make
lifetime gifts of their copyrights to their spouses without incurring gift tax, just
as other property owners are permitted to do.
To remedy this inequality, Congress might consider the following
possibilities: First, Congress should provide that a transfer of a copyright
qualifies for the marital deduction, thereby eliminating the potential for gift tax
on transfers to spouses. Second, Congress should provide that an author who
gifts or sells a copyright is not subject to gift tax on the value of the termination
right and that no inclusion in the gross estate occurs by reason of these rights.
Third, Congress should adopt an early completion rule, under which the full
value of the copyright (including the value of the termination rights) is subject
to gift tax at the time of the initial gift, and no amount would be includable in
the donor's estate on account of the termination rights .279 Fourth, the author
279. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gi Tax and Making it
Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REv. 759, 789 n.l 117 (2007) (discussing the application of an early
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should be given an election: either (1) treat the termination right conferred at
the time of gift or sale as having been gifted, or (2) include the value of the
right in the gross estate at the time of death. Any of these alternatives would
bring welcome clarity to this area of the law. But to continue treating such
authors as if termination rights were a valuable "string" requiring estate tax
inclusion makes no sense.
VII. Conclusion
Federal copyright law shapes an artist's legacy, in both senses of the word.
Through the ability to terminate prior transfers, an author and the author's heirs
can revisit contracts that turn out to be unwise or imbalanced. Copyright
termination rights, which are tantamount to a property law right of revocation,
allow a creative individual a high degree of control over how others use her
work. But with that right of revocation comes unintended tax consequences.
Transfers during the author's lifetime, whether by gift or by sale, may have
negative gift and estate tax consequences. This Article takes the position that
federal copyright termination rights both protect authors and prevent them from
engaging in effective estate planning. To harmonize the law of copyright and
the law of donative transfers, the tax law should be revised to provide that
termination rights do not provide adverse transfer tax outcomes. Only when the
tax law is changed will the interests of copyright owners truly be served.

completion rule to transfers to grantor retained annuity trusts or qualified personal residence
trusts).

